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Abstract 
This paper examines the significance and necessity of entrenchment of a Bill 
of Rights in the safeguard of fundamental rights and liberties, through a comparative 
analysis of the constitutional legal framework of New Zealand vis-a-vis the Republic 
of Singapore. 
The author suggests firstly, that entrenchment is but one of the few necessary 
components, which would produce, as its quotient, the safeguard of human rights. 
Further, because human rights are neither static nor absolute, therefore. there may he 
'justifiable limitations' on those rights. It is the 'rule of law ' , which ensures that 
limitations upon said rights are 'justifiable' where the rule of law is taken to constitute 
both substantive fairness and procedural fairness. Substantive fairness determines the 
justiciability of the content of the law, whereas procedural fairness determines the 
justiciability of the promulgation of the law. Central to this thesis is the notion that 
substantive fairness is largely determined or undermined by socio-political culture. 
while procedural fairness is determined or undermined by the structure of 
government. 
Subsequently, this paper seeks to show that in Singapore, in spite of its 
rigorous regime of procedural fairness, the political culture (e.g. government's · Asian 
values' invocations, the 'chilling effect' etc) and dominant one-party government ha~ 
bred a 'substantively unfair' human rights regime, particularly in the area of freedom 
of political expression. Furthermore, 'entrenchment' loses its sign1 fie a nee ,, hen :1 
two-thirds majority vote is easily attained. 
Conversely, in New Zealand, the lack of entrenchment has not resulted in a 
(theoretically expected) pallid human rights regime because of the robust application 
of the 'interpretive function' of its Bill of Rights by the Judiciary; further , this 
undermines the fears enunciated in the White Paper (1985)
1 that the Judiciary. as 
unelected representatives, cannot be trusted to be the guardians of fundamental 
liberties. As such, this paper argues/or entrenchment. 
1 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper, A.6 Appendices to the Jou ma! of the /-louse of 
Representatives, Wellington, 1985 
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I FRAMEWORK 
A Introduction 
At its most basic level, a Bill of Rights is an acknowledgment of the intrinsic 
worth and dignity of the individual and a commitment towards the preservation of 
human rights against the untrammeled exercise of State power. While a Bill of Rights 
may exist alone as ordinary legislation, as in the case of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (hereinafter "BORA")2, in most jurisdictions, including Singapore, 
the Bill of Rights is a statutorily incorporated component of a written, entrenched 
Constitution3. This paper focuses on the function of a Bill of Rights in the public 
sphere, where it serves to affirm and protect the autonomy of the individual against 
the State owing to the glaring imbalance of power between the two parties. 4 
The task of safeguarding rights is p1imarily achieved through ensuring that 
rights-inconsistent legislation are struck down, amended, or consistently interpreted 
with the Bill of Rights. Without entrenchment, a Bill of Rights can only serve as a 
substantive safeguard by "affirming rights", since laws passed in a procedurally 
correct manner, may nonetheless legally trump the rights contained within the Bill of 
Rights5, regardless of its content. Therefore, entrenchment of a Bill of Rights is 
necessary to review or strike down rights-inconsistent legislation , providing in theory, 
a double-protection against arbitrary state incursions into individual or minority 
rights. 
Procedural or substantive safeguards individually are inadequate to serve the 
purposes of rights-protection. This argument is derived from the acknowledgement 
that the rule of law consists of both formal ("thin") and substantive (''thick") 
2 See section four of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (hereinafter "BORA") 
3 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore ( 1999 Rev Ed) (subsequentl y referred to a~ the S1ngapurc 
Constitution' or 'the Constitution') 
4 However, the evolution of rights in recent times has seen the application or the Bill of Right~ 
permeate into the private sphere in jurisdictions such as Israel, Germany, United State~. Uni ted 
Kingdom and Canada. See Aharon Barak, "Constitutional Human Ri ghts and Pm ate Lrn .. 111 Daniel 
Friedmann and Daphne Barak-Erez, Human Rights and Private Law ( I ed, Hart Publi ~hing. Oxford. 
2001) 13 
5 Section four BORA, above note 2 
(> 
conceptions6 and can also be seen as a contest, in this order, between the positive 
school of thought and the natural school of thought. Substantively, a Bill of Rights 
affirms the fundamental liberties; procedurally, a Bill of Rights is a legal weapon to 
strike down rights-inconsistent legislation. Similarly, it is the contest and polarization 
between these two conceptions, which has weakened the application of the rule of 
law.7 
Singapore and New Zealand are well juxtaposed in this constitutional analysis 
- firstly, Singapore's Bill of Rights exist in an entrenched form, while BORA does 
not; secondly, while in theory Singapore's Bill of Rights should better protect rights 
than BORA, in application it does not. This paper explores the reasons to this effect. 
Fundamentally, this paper argues that the best protection of individual rights 
and Ii berties is derived from accepting the need to fulfi II both formal and the 
substantive conceptions of the rule of law. This paper further argues that in practice, 
entrenchment only serves as a formal procedural safeguard against state incursions 
into fundamental liberties. As elucidated by Sir Ivor Jennings8 
It is not enough to say with Dicey that 'Englishmen are ruled by the law. 
and by the law alone' or, in other words, that the powers of the Crown and 
its servants are derived from the law; for that is true even of the most 
despotic state 
Substantive safeguards, which affirm rights and freedoms, can be found in the 
"spirit" of constitutional and legal instruments, otherwise known as legal principles, 
which as Dworkin suggests are "different from legal rules ... and all around us"9 
Therefore, substantive safeguards are weakened when principles such as natural 
justice or due process are colored by socio-political invocations such as 'Asian 
values' and other values systems. This paper does not delve into the legitimacy or 
6 Paul Craig, "Formal and Substantive conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework" 
(1997) Public Law, 467 - 487 
7 Thio Li-Ann, "Lex Rex or Rex Lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Lm in Singapore" (Fall 
2002) 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. l, 2 
8 Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5 ed, University of London Press. London , I 959) -i7 
9 Dworkin R, "Taking Rights Seriously: The Model of Rules I" ( 1967) Uni versity of Chicago La 11, 
Review, 14 - 45, 28 
illegitimacy of such invocations, it merely asserts the existence of this phenomenon in 
the evolving constitutional framework. Conversely, entrenchment is a necessary 
procedural safeguard, which enables the Judiciary to serve as a check on the excesses 
of the other branches of government. Therefore, this paper argue that entrenchment 
of a Bill of Rights, while a desirable component of any constitutional framework , 
cannot be taken as a sole guarantor of rights. 
B Outline 
The first pai1 of this paper explores the nature of the rule o/'/m1· and 1t~ lorma l 
and substantive implications. The argument postulated being that cultural rclat1, 1-, 111 
and political expedience greatly shape a society's understanding or the rule or J;_rn. 
thereby resulting in divergent conceptions. This part of the paper also explores the 
extent of that divergence. 
The second pai1 of this paper looks at the normative functions of Bill or 
Rights, and the implications of entrenchment in the safeguard of rights. Against this 
standard BORA and Part IV of the Singapore Constitution will be compared. 
The third part of this paper looks at the adequacy existing substantive and 
procedural safeguards for fundamental rights and freedoms in New Zealand and 
Singapore. And further considers the strength of alternative safeguards in ew 
Zealand, apart from the entrenchment of BORA. 
The fourth part of this paper provides a comparative analysis of the protection 
afforded freedom of expression in Singapore and New Zealand as a case study. 
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II Fleshing out the Rule of Law 
A Substance, Form and Realism 
The rule of Jaw is an ambiguous concept 10, and further, one, which has been 
mauled to pieces in constitutional discourse to serve political expedience 11 
Nonetheless fundamentally, its meaning can be taken literally - it is the rule of la w 
and not the rule through law 12 , nor the rule by mer/1; intrinsically, it is the absence or 
arbitrary power. 
It has been asserted that the pnmary meanmg of the rule of Jaw 1s that 
everything must be done according to law, while its secondary meaning 1s that 
government should be conducted within a framework of recognized rules and 
principles, which restrict discretionary power. 14 However, it is important to note that 
such a conception of the rule of law is incomplete; it is merel y a fonnal concepti on -
that is, one, which is concerned with the promulgation of law and the organiza1ion or 
bi . 15 pu 1c power . 
Where a formal reading is taken, the result is that the rule of law potentiall y 
allows the state to validate itself - laws are passed to legitimize state actions. 
Although Raz emphasizes, inter alia 16, that 'a ll laws should be prospect ive. open and 
clear', nonetheless so Jong as the legislative procedure is complied with, the la"' is 
valid, notwithstanding its content. 
10 Joseph PA, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers Ltd , 
Wellington, 2001) 196 
11 Michael C Davis, "Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and 
Asian Values" (Spring l 998) 11 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. I 09 , 134 
12 See Kanishka Jayasuriya , "The Rule of' Law and Capita li sm in East A~1a .. ( i 996)Thc P<1ultl Re i ll'II 
Vol. 9, No. 3, 367 - 388 
13 See Raz Joseph, "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue" ( 1977) 93 LQR I 95: f'nr "Ruic 1111ile1 !Iii l,111 ·· ,cL' 
Goodhart AL, "The rule of law and absolute sovereignty" ( 1958) J 06 Un11 Penn~) lvania L Re i lJ-13 
14Wade ECS and Bradley AW, Constitutional and Administrative Law ( I O d. Longman. London. 
1985) chap. 6; Dicey A Y, An /11trod1-1Ctio11 10 r/le Srudy of the La"' of rhe Co11s1111 1n o11, ed l-:..C. ·. v\ 11dc 
(10 ed, Macmillan, London, 1959), chap 4; Ivor Jennings, Til e Lml' and tile Co1wi1111io11. see abo ve 
note 8 
15 See Joseph PA, Constitutional and Ad111inis1ra1ive Law in Ne\\' Zealand, above note I 0 
16 "( l) All laws should be prospective, open and clear ... (2) Laws should be relauvel) stable .. (]) the 
making of particular laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by open. stable. c lea r and general 
rules", Raz Joseph, "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue", above note 13 
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Conversely, the substantive conception of the rule of law is concerned with the 
content of the law, which is greatly influenced by "non-legal" elements such as socio-
political culture, values systems and historical heritage. 17 De Smith provides a 
complete definition of the rule of law thus 18 
(a) The powers exercised by politicians and officials must have a legitimate foundation; 
they must be based on authority conferred by law; and 
(b) The law should conform to minimum standards of justice, both substantive and 
procedural 
Current legal thinkers such as Paul Craig argue that it is the substantive 
conception of the rule of law, which should preside, particularly in the field of public 
law. Firstly, Craig argues that the implications for public law doctrine are more 
"open" than is commonly imagined. Therefore, it is wrong to conclude that the formal 
rule of law only enables the courts to apply formal constraints on governmental 
power, or that it excludes all reference to moral considerations. 19 Secondly, Craig 
argues that 'pure formalism' is a myth 20 and that any depiction of administrative law21 
framed in terms of democracy, the separation of powers and the basis for judicial 
review is manifestly substantive, whether one agrees with it or not. 22 
However, in a realistic view of law, the machine does nor run by itself. There 
are, no less than in Austin's time, people in positions of power pulling its levers. The 
substantive conception of the rule of law suggests that law is intractably politics. On 
the other hand, theorists such as Hart and Kelsen strenuously advocate a de-politicised 
conception of law and implicitly suggest that law can have a unity, system and 
17 "Many of the principles, which can be derived from the basic idea of the Rule of Law. depend for 
their validity or importance on the particular circumstances of different societies" Raz, "The Rule of 
Law and its Virtue", above, note 13 
18 Smith SA and Brazier R, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8 ed. Penguin Books. London. 
1998) 17 
19 Craig P, Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law a!ld Sllpremacy, (2003) Publi c Law. l 0-+ 
20 "The conceptual label of formalism is unwarranted in its own terms. This is especially important 
given that such labels are intentionally pejorative, and can mean all manner of things", Stone M, 
"Formalism", in Coleman and Shapiro, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and rite 
Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press , 2002) Chap. 5 
21 "There is no distinction between constitutional and administrative law right s that form part of the 
rule of law and those, which do not." Craig P, Consriruriona/ Fo1111dario11.1, rite Rule of L,111 11111' 
Supremacy, above note 19, 103 
22 Craig, Constitlltional Foundations, the Rule of Law and S11pre111acy, above note 19. I 05 
integrity independent of politics, consequently, that the idea of the rule or la\11 is in 
some sense, built into the very notion of law. 23 For Kelsen, a major reason for his 
refusal to accept the state as an entity above Jaw is because, when it 1s recognized a:,, 
such, appalling things can be done in its name24 
Whereas the individual as such is in no way thought entitled to coerce others , to 
dominate or even kill them, it is nevertheless his supreme right to do all this in 
the name of God, the nation or the state, which for that very reason he loves, and 
lovingly identifies with, as "his" God, "his" nation and "his" state 
Similarly, positivist Joseph Raz cautions against over-theo1izing and 
exaggerating the value of the rule of law, as "it is merely one of the political ideals or 
virtues, which a legal system may lack of possess to a greater or lesser degree. "25 
However, Raz's conception of the rule of law is essentially a formal one - Law should 
be prospective, open, stable and clear26 or in a nutshell, "capable of providing 
effective guidance"27 . Raz's conception of the rule of law as being independent of 
morals and values system has led him to concede that 
A non-democratic legal system ... may in principle, conform to the requirements 
of the rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened 
Western democracies. This does not mean that it will be better off than those 
Western democracies. It will be an immeasurably worse legal system, but it will 
excel in one respect: in its conformity to the rule of law. 
23Cotterrell Roger LLD, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy ( I 
ed, Butterworths, London and Edinburgh, 1989) 113 
24 Kelsen, H. "God and the State", P. Heath, in 0. Weinberger (ed) Hans Kelsen - Essays in Legal and 
Moral Philosophy (Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1973) 67; Also, "A non-democratic legal system ... may in 
principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the 
more enlightened Western democracies. This does not mean that it will be better off than those Western 
democracies. It will be an immeasurably worse legal system, but it will excel in one respect: in its 
conformity to the rule of law." Raz, 'The Rule of Law and Its Virtue', above note 13, 196 
25 "It is also to be insisted that the rule of law is just one of the virtues, which a legal system may 
possess and by which it is to be judged. It is not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality 
(before the law or otherwise), and human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of 
man", Raz, 'The Rule of Law and Its Virtue', above note 13, 196 
26 Also "Principles of natural justice must be observed. The courts should have review powers over the 
implementation of the other principles. The courts should be easily accessible. The discretion of the 
crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law" Raz, 'The Rule of Law and Its 
Virtue', above note 13,215; See also Fuller Lon, "Positivism And Fidelity To Law: A Reply To 
Professor Hart" (1958) 71 Harv L Rev 630,660 
27 Raz, 'The Rule of Law and Its Virtue' above note 13, 215 
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Therefore, this author asserts that the acknowledgment and acceptance of both 
the substantive and formal conceptions of the rule of law is inle(?ral in the pur')uit or 
the rights-protection in a democratic legal sys tem. At the same lime, effort~ to comp!) 
with both the substantive and formal conceptions of the rule of la½ should be 
balanced. An overemphasis on substantive compliance could lead to bigotry and 
paternalism, where Parliament or the Judiciary dictates what is morally virtuous for 
society, which undermines democracy. Similarly, history has shown that an 
overemphasis on procedural compliance can prove disastrous, as evidenced by the 
'legal' brutality of the Fascist government in the era of azi Germany. 28 
B Influences on the Conception of the Rule of Law 
This part of the paper looks at some of the historical and political influences 
that have shaped the conception of the rule of law in Singapore an d ew Zealand: the 
objective being to ascertain if either Singapore or ew Zealand ascribe to a c.lc~1rahl, 
"balanced" conception of the rule of law. 
1. Significance of Westminster Heritage 
N Z I cl J 9 cl S. ,() The constitutional framework of both ew ea an - an ingapore· arc 
founded on the British Westminster model. 31 Both jurisdictions apply the laws or 
28 Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in tir e Contemporary World, ( l ed, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapoli s. 
1971) 118 
29 McDowell Wand Webb D, The New Zealand Legal System: Structures, Processes & Legal Theory 
(2 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) I I I 
30 Ong Ah Chuan v PP [ 1980) I MLJ 64,865, per Lord Diplock describing Singapore's C'nnstitu11on a, 
one "founded on the Westminster model" 
31 "In its narrower sense, the main features of the Westminster model are - firstly. 1t i~ a consti tuuonal 
system in which the head of state is not the effective head of government; second ly, ,n which the 
effective head of government is a Prime Minister presiding over a Cabinet composed of M,mster~ over 
whose appointment and removal he has at least a substantial measure of control ; thirdl y, 111 which the 
effective executive branch of government is Parliamentary inasmuch as Ministers must be member~ of 
the legislature; and thirdly, in which Ministers are collectively and individually responsible to a freely 
elected and representative legislature." See Smith SA "Westminster's Export Models: The Legal 
Framework of Responsible Government" (1961 - 63) l Journal of Commonwealth and Political 
Studies, 2 - 16; Roberts-Wray Kenneth, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (S tevens and Sons, London, 
1966) 289 
12 
England in common law32 , and only recently abolished appeals to the Privy Council 33 . 
Both New Zealand and Singapore can be viewed as autochthonous
34 transplants of the 
English system, whether self-seeded without legal antecedent, or constitutionally 
transposed in accordance with the legal system's rule of recognition and the 
succession of rules. 
For Singapore, since 9 August 1965 , Singapore has been a sovereign republic 
with a Westminster-modeled parliamentary system of government. The organs or 
state (the executive35 , the legislature36 and the judiciary
37
) are provided for in a 
written constitution. The Head of State is the President
38
, although elected by popular 
mandate, exercises essentially custodial powers and ceremonial duti es . 
For New Zealand, the Constitution Act of 1986, which revoked the application 
of the 1852 Act symbolically separated the legal and historical roots of the New 
Zealand constitution, by transferring legislative powers from the General Assembly to 
the Parliament of New Zealand. 39 
32 See R v Symonds ( 1847) NZPCC 387 and Imperial Laws Application Act 1988: The inheritance of 
English laws and the actions of the British authorities in 1839 - 1840 suggest occupation and 
settlement as the legal basis for the Crown 's claim to territorial sovereignty; See Jm,eph PA. 
Constitutional and Administrative La IV in Nell' Zealand, above, note I 0, 17 - 31: Also " " /crn " 1nL·lude~ 
written law and any legislation of the United Kingdom or other enactment or instrument \I hablle\ er 
which is in operation in Singapore and the common law in so far as it is in operation in Singapore and 
any custom or usage having the force of law in Singapore", s 2(1) Constitution of the Republic ot 
Singapore, and s 162 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
33 The constitutionality of the legislation abolishing appeals to Privy Council was challenged at the 
High Court in Singapore, see Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Ho111 e Affairs & Ors 11989 I 2 MLJ -1-19: See 
Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act 1994 (No 2 of 1994), which recei ved Pres idential as~ent on 16 Mar 
1994. In 1989, appeals to the Privy Council had already been significa ntl y curta il ed ~1 it h the passage ll l 
the Judicial Committee (Amendment) Act (No 21 of 1989), s 2, which amended~ 3 of the Jud1c1al 
Committee Act so as to limit appeals in civil matters to cases in which the parties to the proceeding 
have at any time before the hearing of the case by the appellate court consented in writing to be bound 
by an appeal to the Judicial Committee in that case and in criminal maners to cases where the offence 
was punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the decision of the appellate court was not 
unanimous. 
34 From the Greek word meaning 'sprung from that land itself' 
35 Part V, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 1999 
36 Part VI of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 1999 
37 Part VIII of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 1999 
38 Part V, Chapter l of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 1999 
39 "We do not look to our Westminster heritage for constitutional leg1t1macy and national sovere1gnt'., 
While New Zealanders embrace their colonial past, 'a people's sense of nationhood 1s sell -tulfill1ng .. 
Joseph PA, "The Legal History and Framework of the Const1tullon' ' ,n Colin Jame \ ed. 8 111/dtnl!. !11, 
Constitution, see above note 39, 171 
11 
Both New Zealand and Singapore have strong Parliamentary institutions, 
despite the fact that both are single-chamber Parliaments. ew Zealand has a 
quintessential Westminster Parliament, predicated on the notion of 'Parliamentary 
sovereignty', which has for many years (prior to the introduction of MMP) produced a 
single-party government with a relatively stable party system.-1o While Singapore, has 
characteristically a dominant one-party Parliament.
41 From 1968 to 1981 , the People's 
Action Party (PAP) was the only elected party in Parliament. Even then, the PAP had 
more than a two-thirds majority in Parliament. This allowed the PAP government to 
make fundamental and swift changes to Singapore society through the legal system.
42 
The significance of the Westminster inheritance
43
, in relation to the issue of 
entrenchment, is the imported doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of 
law. 
(a) Parliamentary Sovereignty 
It has been observed that the doct1ine of Parliamentary sovereignt/-1 finds its 
validation in positive legal thought. Fundamentally, it is a legal system wherein the 
40 "New Zealand has long been accorded something of a special status among the worlds democracie~ 
as one of the purest examples of the Westminster model of government, a model of virtually 
unrestrained executive authority with an electoral system which in some ways was more British than 
Britain", Roberts Nigel, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, "New 
Zealand: A Long-Established Westminster Democracy Switches to PR" 
http://www.idea.int/esd/case/new zealand.cfm <last accessed 24 Sep.04> 
41 See generally Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-
roots, (Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1978) 
42 See Tan Eugene Kheng-Boon, "Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way" (2000) 30 
HKLJ 91, 93 
43 
Also, both jurisdictions function as unitary (rather than federal) states, compri sing of the three 
institutions - the legislature, the executive and the Judiciary - that function on the legal doctrine or 
'separation of powers '. However, unlike the British system, both ew Zealand and Singapore are 
unicameral Parliamentary systems, with onl y a si ngle chamber. 
44 For a classical treatment of the subject, see Dicey AV, Part I .. The Sovereignty of Parliament .. 111 , \11 
!11troductio11 to the Study of the Law of the Co11s1i1u1ion, ed E.CS. Wade ( 10 ed, Macmillan. Lonclon. 
1959), chap 4; For a modern analysis of the doctrine, see Bradley AW, ·'The Sovereigrny of Parliament 
- in Perpetuity?" in Jowell, J.L & Oliver D, The Changing Constitution.(-+ ed, Oxford University 
Press , London, 2000) 
1-1 
Judiciary recognizes Parliamentary enactment as the highest source of law .-1 5 A::, 
affirmed in English and New Zealand common law46 
What the statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful , because what the ,tatute 
says and provides is itself the law, and the hi ghes t form of law knov. n to th1, 
country 
The law is what it is, not what it ought to be; and the interpretive function or 
the Judiciary is belittled in such a legal system. As such, the doctrine of Parliamentary 
supremacy is in direct contravention with the doctrine of constitutional supremaC),, 
which features an entrenched Bill of Rights as 'higher law' as will be discussed later 
Parliamentary sovereignty, upon which the Westminster system is premised, 
dictates that Parliament must always be free to legislate for the public good. 
Therefore, entrenchment, which would purposely make it more difficult for a future 
Parliament to undo its legislation47 , contravenes the doctrine of Parliamentary 
· 48 sovereignty. 
Parliamentary sovereignty, as conceived by Dicey, presupposes that 
sovereignty implies illimitability. 49 This doctrine has come under heavy criticism -
foremost, the rule of law requires that it is the law, which regulates all institutions of 
government, not the rule of men. 
Arguments asserting that the rule of law justifies legislative supremacy over 
judicial supremacy are often arguments in favor of the positivist conception of the 
45 See generally, Joseph PA, Constitutional and Administrative Law i11 New Zealand, above note 10, 
461 - 509 
46 Cheney v Conn [1968) l All ER 779, 782 per Ungoed-Thoms J, affirmed in Haliburton v 
Broadcasting Commission 3/12/98, Morris J, HC Auckland CP 342/98, 8 
47 However s. 268 Electoral Act 1993 protects s 60, 74, 168 from legislative amendment or repeal in 
the ordinary way. 
48 "Acts against the power of the Parliament, quod subsequent bind not. .. for it is a maxim in the la\, of 
the Parliament, quod leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant", Coke E, Fourth Parr of the lnstiflltes 
of the Laws of England (London, Brooke, 1797) 42 - 43; Joseph PA, Constiturional and Ad111inistra/lve 
Law in New Zealand, above, note 10,530 - 531 
49 "Every attempt to tie the hands of [a sovereign legislature] breaks down, on the logical and practical 
impossibility of combining absolute legislative authority with restrictions on that authority which, if 
valid, would make it cease to be absolute" Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution ( l O ed, Mac mi !Ian & Co, London, 1965) 68 
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rule of law50; thus, such arguments miss the mark by blatantly ignoring the virtues of 
the substantive conception of the rule of law. Dicey himself conceded that, "if the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty involves the attribution of unrestricted power to 
parliament, the dogma is no better than a legal fiction" 51 
The lack of entrenchment of a Bill of Rights means the Courts cannot strike 
down an Act of Parliament as being unconstitutional. The Act does not limit or 
control the sovereignty of Parliament. If a statute cannot be given a statu tory 
construction that is consistent with the Act, then the Court is obliged to apply the 
particular statute.s2 BORA is to be given a fair, large and liberal interpretation. 53 The 
Court cannot give statutes strained meanings in order to make their meaning 
consistent with the Act. 54 
Ultimately, there is no institution higher than Parliament to serve as a check on 
Parliament.ss The New Zealand Parliament enjoys all the attributes of a sovereign 
legislature. There are no limits on legislative power in a unitary state that has no 
federal divisions, no entrenched laws, and no constitutional Bill of Rights. 56 The 
validity of an Act of Parliament cannot be challenged or called into question in a 
Court of law.s7 Parliamentary enactments prevail over judicial precedent and common 
50Ekins Richard , "Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law" (2003) LQR 119 (J N) l-17 - 1.52 
51 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Co11s1i1111io11, see above note -19. 7 I 
52 See Ministry of Transport v Noort [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) In that case. Cooke P stated that the 
basic rule never to be lost sight of when applying BORA is that, although the Court must stm e tll 
construe the legislation in a manner that is consistent with the Act, if that is not possible then the 
inconsistent provision prevai Is . 
53 See Ministry of Transport v Noori, above note 52, although the Acts Interpretation Act I 92-t. s .'i(J J 
(as quoted) has been repealed and replaced by the Interpretation Act I 999. s 5, which pnl\ ides that 
enactments must be interpreted in light of their purpose. 
54 Ministry of Transport v Noort, above note 52, 272 (CA) per Cooke P 
55 "This is a mythical and false assumption in the context of the modern day pluralist societ). Not nnly 
does the parliamentary executive control Parliament through the vehic le of the party system, the 
mandate wielded by the parliamentary majority is at best imperfect and temporal. Judicial review leaps 
into the fray as an important countermajoritarian check. It is the method by which fundamental 
constitutional values 'trump' the short term values embodied in legislation. Historically, judicial review 
arose as a response to the post-Holocaust fear that laws as evil as those contained in Nazi edic ts might 
be promulgated without check by the legislature." Thio Li-Ann, ·'Trends in Consutut1onal 
Interpretation : Oppugning Ong, Awakening Arumugam?" ( 1997) SJLS 257 
56 See Ex pa rte Selwyn [ 1872] 36 JP 54, where Cockburn CJ and Blackburn J said of such a state that 
"[t]here is no judicial body in the country by which the validity of an Act of Pnrlinment can be 
questioned. An Act of the legislature is superior in authority of any Court of law ... and no Court cou ld 
fronounce judgment as to the validity of an Act of Parliament" 
7 "What the statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and provides is itself 
the law, and the higheset form of law known to this country" Cheney 1° Conn ( !11 spec1or of'Ta.res) 
(1981] l WLR 242,247; (1981] I All ER 779, 782 per Ungoed-Thomas J. See also Q111/1er I A11omn-
16 
law principles58 , subordinate legislation made under Parliament' s delegated 
authority59 , prerogative instruments issued under the Crown ' s constituent power
60
, 
international treaties entered into or ratified by the government
61
, and constitution 
conventions. 6
2 Therefore, unless a hypothetically corrupt Parliament is willing to 
commit "suicide" or abdicate
63 as Dicey suggested, Parliamentary sovereignty 1s 
really64 
An expression of faith in the effectiveness of political checks and the self-
correcting nature of democracy with the will of the parliamentary majority being 
concordant with the will of the popular majority 
Therefore, by embracing the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, New 
Zealand has also embraced Diceyan positivism, which eschews any criterion of legal 
validity and leaves little place for critical thinking about the law-making process.
65 
General [1998] l NALR 513 (CA) and R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37, 50 - 51 and 65 where Elias CJ 
and Tipping J (in a joint judgment) and Thomas J observed that Parliament can abrogate fundamental 
rights, provided it uses express language. The Courts presume against Parliament intending to effect 
this result in the absence of express or emphatic words. 
58 Parliament can reverse judicial decisions with retrospective effect, although to deprive litigants of the 
fruits of victory is a usurpation of judicial power in breach of constitutional convention . Compare the 
Cultha Development (Clyde Dam) Empowering Act 1982 enactment before the Muldoon Government 
was declined a water right for the Clyde high dam, following proceedings before the High Court and 
the former Planning Tribunal. Compare also the War Damages Act 1965 (UK), which retrospecti ve ly 
negated the decision of the House of Lords in Burmah Oil Co ( Burmah Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate 
[1965] AC 75 . 
59 Parliament may, through use of the "Henry VIII clause", accord primacy to delegated legislation 
over other designated statutes of Parliament. The use of these clauses has been criti cized fo r reposing 
undue power in the executive: see Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (Cmd 5060, 1932) 36 
- 38 and 59 - 60 ("the Donoughmore Report") 
60 See for example, Constitution Act 1986, s 6 (1) qualifying the Governor-General 's power of 
appointment of ministers delegated under cl X of the Letters Patent Constituting the Office of 
Governor-General of New Zealand 1983 (SR 1983/225) 
61 International treaties are not enforceable in the municipal Courts unl e!>s incorpora ted b) lcg1,lat1 on 
into domestic law. Ashby v Minister of /111111igratio11 [ 1981 J I NZLR 2~~ (CAJ; See al~o Sa/01111111 1 
Customs and Excise Co111111issioners [ 1967] 2 QB 116, 143 ; [ 1966] 3 Al I ER 87 I. 87 5 (CA) per 
Diplock LJ ("the sovereign power of the Queen in Parliament extends to breaking treat 1e,"). The 
Courts nonetheless presume that Parliament does not intend to legislate in violation of ew Zealand·, 
international treaty obligations, and will construe ambiguous legi slation accordingl y. 
62 See Madzimba111uto v Larnder-Burke [ 1969] l AC 645, 723 (CA) Lord Reid observed of the 
convention that the United Kingdom would not legislate for Southern Rhodes ia without its request and 
consent: "That was a very important convention but it had no legal effect in limit ing the legal plrner ll l 
Parliament" 
63 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Co11stit11tio11 , see above note <-19 . 68 - 69 
64 Thio Li-Ann, "Trends in Constitutional Interpretation: Oppugning Ong. Awakening Arumu ga111·1". 
above note 55, 256 
65 Joseph PA, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, above, note I 0, 464,480; Abo. 
Joseph points out that the Diceyan conception of illimitable Parliament is a paradox; tf "Parli ament I !, 
not bound by its predecessors", then Parliament is disabled from enacting unchangeab le legis lation and 
not sovereign, as such, Dicey 's doctrine is paradoxical. 
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However, it is noteworthy that in New Zealand, under the recently adopted 
"Proportional system" or MMP (1996) of Parliamentary elections66 , the convention of 
ministerial responsibility requires that the government resign if defeated on a vote of 
confidence.67 Further, the demands in the 1980s for means to restrain governments by 
referendum have abated since MMP68, which is a positive indication of its ability to 
better represent all sectors of society. Nonetheless, this should not be wrested as an 
argument against entrenching BORA, since the objective of entrenchment is to create 
a procedural safeguard against rights-inconsistent legislation. Having revealed the 
fallacy in the Diceyan conception of "illimitable government", it is again submitted 
that entrenchment is both a necessary and an absent feature of BORA. 
(b) The "rule of law" in Singapore 
As observed by the International Human Rights Committee of the New York 
City Bar Association, in Singapore, "despite the trappings, the Rule of Law in 
Singapore today has given way to empty legalism "
69 Although harsh-sounding, there 
is some truth in this observation as this part of the paper will show. 
Firstly, the Courts in Singapore have eschewed a broad, purposive approach to 
the rule of law, for a niggardly, fonnalistic conception. The Privy Council 70
 in Ong 
Ah Chuan 71 , hearing an appeal from Singapore, asserted that the word 'law ' in any 
Westminster based Constitution, particularly in fundamental liberties chapters, must 
66See, generally, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Nigel Roberts , New 
Zealand Case Study, http://www.idea.int/esd/case/new zea land.cfm <last accessed 24 Sep. 04> 
67 Appropriation or Imprest Supply bills are automatically treated as matters of confidence: see McGee 
DG, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (GP Publications , Wellington, 1994) 72. Compare the 
circumstances surrounding the Hon Jenny Shipley 's leadership of a minority government from August 
1998 until the 1999 elections: see A Stockely "Constitutional Law" ( 1999) NZLR 173 
68 Colin James , "The Political History and Framework since 1980", in Building 1he Cons1irn1io11 . above 
note 39, 166 
69 Beatric S. Frank et al., "The Decline of the Rule of Law in Malaysia and Singapore Part II -
Singapore, Report of the Committee on International Human Rights of the Assoc1at1on of the Bar of the 
City of New York", ( 1991) 46 The Record 7, 17 i See, generally, http://www.sin~apore-
window.org/ri2:hts .htm <last accesed 13 Sep 04> 
70 Appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1989, see Teo Soh Lung v Minis1erfor Ho111e Affairs 
& Ors, above note 33 
71 Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981) l MLJ 64 (Privy Council); see too Hwa Tua Tau 1· Public Prosecwor & 
Associated Appeals [1981) 2 MLJ (Privy Council) per Lord Diplock 
IS 
refer to a system of law, which incorporates the fundamental rules of natural justice. 7~ 
As such, the Lord Diplock emphasized73 
It would have been taken for granted by makers of the Constitution that the word 
'law' to which citizens could have recourse for the protection of fundamental 
liberties assured to them by the Constitution would be a system of law that did not 
flout these fundamental rules. If it were otherwise, it wou ld be a mi suse of language 
to speak of law as something, which affords ·protection· for the 1nd1 \ 1dual 1n the 
enjoyment of his fundamental liberties and the purported entrenchment ul article\ 
9(1) and 12(1) would be little more than a mockery. 
However, this expansive approach according protection to human rights hm, 
been replaced by a nan-ower, or one could generously term, 'positi vis ti c' approach as 
evidenced in recent cases.74 This approach advocates that so long as the procedure or 
legislation or constitutional amendments is complied with, the law is va lid , 
notwithstanding its content. Common law development of rights-protections in 
Singapore has been consistently blocked by legislative over-ruling. 75 In such a 
political climate, the supremacy of the Constitution is called to question. 
Secondly, legal doctrine tells us that the Singapore courts will not look to 
constitutional cases from other jurisdictions. Singapore courts often cite Srare o/ 
Kelantan v Government of the Federation of Malaya76 in support or the four \,\ alls 
doctrine, the notion that the 
Constitution is primarily to be interpreted within its own four walls and not in 
light of the analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain, the 
United States of America or Australia. 
A closer look at the jurisprudence suggests, however, that the use of foreign 
constitutional cases is very much the norm in Singapore; the Supreme Court (which 
72 See Ong Ah Chuan v PP, above note 71, 865 per Lord Diplock 
73 Ong Ah Chuan v PP, above note 71, 865 per Lord Diplock 
74 Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs & Ors, above note 33, per Chua J, " In my judgment 
Parliament has the power to amend any provision of the Constitution so long as the special procedure 
required (i.e. two-thirds majority) for the amendment is followed." 
75 See Thio Li-ann, "An "i" for an "I"? Singapore's Communitarian Model of Constitutional 
Adjudication" (1997) 27 HKLJ 152 
76Kelantan v Government of the Federation of Malaya [ I 963] MLJ 355, 358 
J<J 
comprise the Court of Appeal and the High Court) often does look beyond the four 
walls of the Constitution in its constitutional jurisprudence, but only where it is to the 
interest of "national security" or "public order". 77 
Thirdly, in place of its Westminster heritage and Diceyan positivism, the 
"spirit" of the Singapore Constitution is characterized by a curious hybrid of 'Asian 
values' and 'relative democracy', which critics have come to label 'Statist Legalism' 78 
This entails a form of legal ideology, which is different from that, which is 
dominant in Western Europe. Legalism becomes akin to a kind of formalism in 
the sense of being an instrument, a means of achieving specific ends. Legal 
formalism - rather than legal positivism - with its emphasis on the application 
of formal procedures, rules and processes is the appropriate ideology for thi~ 
Statist legalism." 
An example of the so-called "communitarian approach" in practice can be 
seen in the application of the White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmon y. 7'J 
Contextually, Singapore is a multi-cultural society, where the dominant racial groups 
are Chinese, Malay and Indian. The drafters of the Constitution80 were desirous or 
ensuring there ought to be "no room for any division of citizens or of peoples Jiving 
in a free and democratic nation into citizens or peoples of different races, languages 
and creeds", particularly as "the Chinese constitute the majo1ity among the multi-
racial peoples in the Republic"81 Therefore, section 18 of the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) was drafted to pre-emptively quell civil unrest. 
2 
77 See Thio Li-ann, "An "i" for an "J"? above note 75, 172 - 74; See Ramraj V, .. Comparative 
Constitutionalisms: The Remaking of Constitutional Orders in South-East Asia .. 6 ing J 1111·1 & Comp 
L. 302, "The real dispute is not over the use of foreign cases per se. but the u~c that 1~ made lll the111 ·· 
78 Kanishka Jayasuriya, The rule of law and capitalism in East Asia, above note .'l::!. 371 
79 White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony Cmnd 21 of 1989; See Report of the Selen 
Committee on the Maintenance of the Religious Harmony Bill (Bill o l-+/90), Parl 7 of I 990. 
presented to Parliament on 29 October 1990; See also Winslow. "The Separation of Rel1g1011 and 
Politics: Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 1990" ( 1990) 32 Mai LR 327 
80 See Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966, Tan, Yeo and Lee, Constitutional L(lll' in 
Malaysia and Singapore (2 ed, Butterworths, Asia, 1997) l 020 
81 See Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966, para 23; Singapore wa~ embroiled 111 racial nob 
in 1963 leading to its separation from Malays ia. See generall y, Chan Heng Chee. The Drno1111c.1 of 011e 
Party Dominance: The PAP at the Crass Roots. above note 41; see, genera ll y. Drysdale John. 
Singapore: Struggle for Success, (Times Publishing Bhd, ingapore, 198-1-) 
82 ''This Bill is a recognition of a retrogression or potential deterioration in reli gious harmony ... We 
introduce it more in sorrow than with joy. It is to prevent us from sliding backward. It i~ an act aimed at 
preserving common sense and harmony" (Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 23 February 1990 at cols. 
1147-1159) 
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Talang a closer look however, it is observed that in practice, the MRHA is 
also applied to prohibit acts that indirectly cause disharmony, when religion and 
politics are mixed. 83 It does so by issuing restraining orders of up to two years 
(subject to renewal), at the discretion of the Presidential Council, whose decisions are 
precluded from judicial review under section 18 MRHA. To any layman , such a 
powerful discretion couched under such a 'communitarian' objective ought to raise 
suspicions, particularly where politics is at issue84 . 
2. Singapore's "Asian Roots" 
Singapore largely eschews its Westminster heritage85 under the cloak of 
cultural relativism and 'Asian values' 86 . The Asian values ideology has three distinct 
leitmotifs. 87 Firstly, there is the argument that the liberal West is permeated by the 
ethos of individualism and a 'rights culture' which is contrasted with the 
83 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap 167 A) (hereinafter "MRHA") s 8( l )( b) - (d) 
84 In 1987 the government detained a group of22 Roman Catholic social activists . (all of whom were 
students at the National University of Singapore), without trial, accusing them of using church 
organizations as cover for a Marxist plot. See http://countrystudies.us/singapore/'.24.htm <last accessed 
17 Sep. 04> "After releasing 2 I of the 22 by the end of I 987, subject to restricti ons on their freedom of 
movement and association, the Singapore authorities rearrested eight in April 1988 after they had 
signed a public statement denying the accusations against them and describing their mistreatment in 
detention. The government also arrested two lawyers who had defended the detainees. as well as 
another former detainee who had not signed the April statement but was accused of helping to draft and 
distribute it." http: //www.hrw.om/reports/l 989/WR89/SinQ.apor.htm <last accessed I Oct. 0-b: For 
events surrounding the detainment, See generally, http://www.sing_apore-
window.org/sw0 l/01052l m1.htm <last accessed I Oct. 04> 
85 "The basic difference in our approach springs from our traditional Asian value system, which places 
the interests of the community over and above that of the individual. In English doctrine, the rights of 
the individual must be the paramount consideration; we shook ourselves free from the confines of 
English norms, which did not accord with the customs and va lues of Singapore society." Address by 
then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Opening of the Singapore Academy of Law, ( 1990) 2 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 155. 
86 
See, generally, Bauer JB and Daniel A Bell (eds), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999); Theodore Wm de Bary, Asian Values and H11111an 
Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Harvard University Press. 1998) ; Mauzy Diane. 
"The Human Rights and "Asian Values" Debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues" 
(1997) The Pacific Review 210; and Kwong YC, "Leninism, Asian Culture and Singapore" ( 1999 ) ':. 7 
Asian Profile 217; In 1988, Singapore's then First Deputy Prime Mirnster. Goh Cho" Tong. prnpo~ed <1 
radical new plan which was taken up and addressed in 1989 by the then President Wee K1 m Wee \ 1 ho 
stated: "in less than a generation, attitudes and outlooks of Singaporeans. especially younger 
Singaporeans, have shifted. Traditional Asian ideas of morality, duty and soc iety which have sustained 
and guided us in the past are giving way to a more Westernised, individualistic and self-cen1red outloo" 
on life." Singapore Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (M!TA). Our Shared Values 
87 Kanishka Jayasuriya, 'Understanding 'Asian values' as a Form of Reactionary Modern1zac1on ·. 
(1998) Contemporary Politicis, Vol. 4, Number I, 77 
communitarian ethos of the East where familial duties and community obligation play 
a central role in social life. 88 Secondly, the virtue of discipline is enshrined - in 
politics, in the family, and in the workplace. Thirdly, reinforcing the principle of duty 
and discipline is an organic notion of state and society, which is intimately associated 
with the common 'good' of economic development. 
These three leitmotifs, either individually, or in combination, have provided a 
powerful normative framework through which state power can be justified and 
exercised; and more importantly, they allow the constitution of a sense of legitimate 
social purpose to be pursued by the exercise of state power. 89 
Furthermore, enshrined in the Shared Values White Paper90 , are inter alia, 
paternalistic and utilitarian principles such as "consensus, not contention" and 
"community before self', purportedly derived from Confucianism, and of direct 
relevance to our 'Asian' society. The tactical refrain of 'Asian values' has been 
88 "In the East, the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum 
enjoyment of his freedoms. This can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of 
contention and anarchy" Zakaria, F "Culture is Destiny: a Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew", ( 1994) 
Foreign Affairs No. 2, 112 
89 Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Understanding 'Asian values' as a Form of Reactionary Modernization", 
above note 87, 78 
90 Shared Values White Paper, 1991, cmd. 1, para. 4l(Sing.) A paper without legal effect but which 
may be taken as the government's preferred ideology. For a critical reading, see Balakrishnan N, 
"Values Offer Shares in Confucian Society: Esprit de Core" (Feb. 7 1991) 151 (6) Far E. Econ. Rev., 
Feb. 27. In 1988, Goh Chok Tong said in Parliament: "Singaporeans expect the Prime Minister, and 
indeed any minister, any MP, to be a superior man, a man of ability and integrity who can set things 
right and ensure good government. He must be a junzi, a Confucian gentleman." What Qualities Would 
You Want in Political Leaders? (Nov. 28 1992) Straits Times (Sing), 33 
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criticized for being a mechanism of political expedience91 , canvassed under the 
banner of cultural relativisrn92 
Unless a nation is geographically, historically , culturall y, and lingui stica ll y 
separated from other nations ... no sys tem of values, principles, and convention~ 
may be regarded as "nationalistic" in the narrow and jingoistic sense of the word 
The critique sterns from the argument that there is no single culture within a 
state and thus the state cannot espouse a fully representative concept of culture. 
Furthermore, "culture" is a dynamic concept, prone to both endogenous and 
exogenous change.93 
With specific regards to Confucianism, academics have observed that the 
Confucian nature, which is feudal, hierarchical and authoritarian, is in blunt con1'11c1 
with the rule of law rather than with human rights values. 94 Firstly, the them) ol 
separation of powers is not a concept to be found in the Chinese feudal dynastie~. 
which ostentatiously embraced the rule of rnen. 95 During the two thousand year feudal 
period, the judicial function was an essential power of Chinese execut1 vc 
91 Singapore is a curious hybrid of Confucianism, Westminster autochthony and "'Asian va lues". In thi s 
political context, conceptual and substantial difficulties arise in placing Singapore in the 
democratization debate. Foremost, the tension between the presence of a popularly elected sing le -party 
dominant government, and the tendency of this government to impose, through the due parliamentary 
processes, substantively highly anti-democratic laws and administrative regulati o ns o n society. 
Secondly, the ambivalence of an electorate, which is increasi ngly willing to vo ices its dissatisfaction~ 
with unacceptable state interventions but without the desire to support he development of strong 
opposition parties, let alone a change of government. The result is a highl y stab le polity, whi ch many 
critics continue to characterize as an 'authoritarian regime '. See, also. Chua Beng-Huat. "Arrested 
development: democratisation in Singapore" (1994) Third World Quarterly, Vol 15, No-+: Then Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong," .. . the system we want is actually one-party and many sma ll partie~ to l,.eep 
us on our toes" in 'PAP loss would be 'hard to contemplate given the grave consequences' Straits 
Times, Singapore, 10 Dec 1992, 22. 
92 Ho Wing Meng, "Values Premises Underlying the Transformation of Singapore" in Wheatley Paul 
and Kernial Singh Sandhu, Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore (Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies , Singapore, 1989) 671 - 688 
93 See Zakaria F, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew", (1994) 73 Foreign Affairs 
109; "Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values", 73 Foreign 
Affairs 189 (1994) 
94 Wang Xiaoxuan, "Confucianism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law" (2003) LLM Research Paper . 
31 - 32 
95 Justice H. Suresh "The Supreme Court in a Liberal Democracy" 
http://www.ahrchk.net/pub/mainfile.php/cambodia Judiciary/I I I/ <last accessed 27 September 2004> 
cited in Wang Xiaoxuan, "Confucianism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law", above note 94, 34 
23 
govemment. 96 Confucianism is in direct contravention to democracy and Westminster 
ideals of the rule of law. A society, which ensh1ines the outmoded precepts of 
Confucianism, cannot, in theory, be called a democracy. 
Confucianism, 'Asian values' and the Shared Values White Paper have 
distorted the concept of the rule of law insofar as these doctrines advocate a niggardl y 
approach to individual liberties. As exhorted by the Privy Counci 197 , 
In a constitution founded on the Westminster model and particularly that part of 
it that purports to assure to all individual ci ti zens the continued enj oyment of 
fundamental liberties or rights, references to 'la w ' in such contexts a~ 'in 
accordance with law', 'equality before the law ', 'protection of the la w·, and the 
like, in their Lordships' view, refer to a system of law, which incorporates those 
fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of the 
common law of England 
Invocations of Confucianism and "Asian Values" are not authentic and 
further , conflict with the rule of law. Furthermore, it is significant the Constitution of 
Singapore lacks a preamble.98 This makes it easier for extra-textual invocations to be 
made99 , which may incorporate such principles and values. 100 Where va lues such as 
"society before self' are prevalent in a society's political climate, it has the potential 
to "renovate" the rights conferred on the individual , to the extent of non-exi stence. 
96 He Weifang, The Judicial System and Governance in Traditional China, in The Rule of Lm1· -
Perspectives from the Pacific Rim (The Mansfield Center fo r Pacific Affairs, 2000) 92 cited 111 Wang 
Xiaoxuan, "Confucianism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law" (2003) LLM Research Paper. 34 
97 Ong Ah Chuan v PP, above note 71, 865 per Lord Diplock 
98 "A written constitution is rarely ever a complete document containing all the rules for constitutional 
government." SA de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, edi ted by Harry Street and Rodne) 
Brazier (5 ed, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1985). chap. l; Wheare KC'. Modem 
Constitutions (London : Oxford University Press, 1962), chap. l 
99 Although contrary to the traditionally accepted consti tuti onal 1nterpretat1on, th1~ approaL'i1 1, 
consistent with the value identified in Shared Values as community over 111d1v1dual .. the ,(11crc1gnt 1. 
integrity and unity of Singapore are undoubtedl y the paramount mandate ol' the C'o11'1 1tu t1on. and 
anything, including religious beliefs and practices, which tend to run co unter to the,e obJecme, mu,1 
be restrained." Chan Hiang Leng Colin and Others v Pllblic Prosecuror [ 19941 3 SLR 662 (HCJ 
100"Additional rules, practices, or assumptions, give life to a constitution." Philip . Pillai and Ke1111 
Tan Yew Lee, "Constitutional Development", as ci ted in Wheatley Paul and Kernial Singh Sandhu. 
Management of Sllccess: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, above note 92 
2-1 
In such a political climate, procedural safeguards against a permanent erasure 
of rights are vital, and equally, a purposive approach be taken to rights by an 
independent Judiciary. 101 
III FORM OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
A Concept of Entrenchment 
Entrenchment of the Bill of Rights as 'Higher Law' is primarily a procedural 
safeguard against the excesses of Parliament. The effect of the entrenchment of a Bill 
or Charter of Rights entails the requirement of 'special majorities' for the amendment 
of the fundamental freedoms contained therein. Article 11(2) of the Draft New 
Zealand Bill of Rights 102 states 
No provision of this Act. .. shall be repealed, or amended, or in any way altered 
unless the proposal. .. (a) is passed by a majority of 75% of all the members of the 
House of Representatives; or (b) has been carried by a majority of the va lid votes cast 
at a poll of the electors of the General and Maori electoral districts 
Similarly, the requirement of a 75% majority 103 is necessary for Constitutional 
amendments to be passed in Singapore. As such, entrenchment is a procedural 
safeguard against the subversion (by the legislature) of Constitutional laws. Without 
entrenchment of the Bill of Rights , government can potentially ride roughshod over 
· · · 104 mmonty interests . 
Substantively, entrenchment entails the legal concept of a Bill of Rights as 
'Higher Law' or 'Super-Law' 105 , as opposed to ordinary legislation . This principle can 
101 see Taw Cheng Kong v PP (1998] l Sing. L. R. 943,955, para 24H-I (Karthiges us JA) - affirmed 
Ong Ah Clzuan, note 89 
102 Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights Bill , LEG 7-1-3, 4 December 1984 
103 Article 5(2) Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 1999 
104 Palmer Geoffrey, Bridled Power: New Zealand gover11111 e111 under MMP (Oxford University Press. 
Auckland, 1997) 266 
105 New Zealand Law Society Submissions 011 rhe White Paper ·'A Bill of Rights For New Zealand. '.20 
December 1985 (extract), 140 
be found in Article three of the Draft New Zealand Bill of Ri ghts 106 and Artic le four 
of the Singapore Constitution 1999. The basis for a 'Higher law' is deri ved from the 
acknowledgment of an individual's intrinsic worth and the inalienabilit y of his/her 
fundamental liberties.107 Entrenchment therefore, places the value of the individual 
above the authority of the State. 
With specific regard to BORA, the lack of entrenchment has created an 
anemic document, which does not con-espond to the substanti ve conccpt1on u! the rule 
of law, since it is a constitutional document meant to "affirm and protect ! undamcntal 
rights and liberties". In its function, BORA is powerless against nghts-1ncon~1~tcnl 
legislation. It is only applicable to bills , that is , legislation in its pre-conceived form 
'08 Therefore, BORA is mostly an educative document in its present state. by sen ing 
as a guiding light to legislative drafters . 
B False Entrenchment 
Both Singapore and New Zealand are democracies with popularly elected 
governments. However, there is a stark difference in their Parliamentary 
compositions, which has a direct impact on the concept of 'entrenchment ' in each 
jurisdiction. Singapore's Parliament has been described as a 'dominant one-part) 
government', while New Zealand's Parliament, a 'coalition government'. Presentl y, 
Singapore's Parliament comprises of 84 seats, 82 of which belong to the People · 
Action Party (PAP), rendering it a one-party Parliament; New Zealand's Parliament 
comprises of 120 seats, with seven political parties , with the Labour party presently 
holding a slim majority of 52 seats. 109 
106 Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights Bill , LEG 7-1-3, 4 December 1984 
107 "Constitutional rights are enjoyed because they are constitutional in nature . They are enjoyed as 
fundamental liberties - not stick and carrot privileges. To the extent that the constitutional is supreme, 
those rights are inalienable." Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] l SLR 943, 965, para 56D 
108 See Ministry of Transport v Noort, above note 52, 283 (CA) applied in Moon en v Film and 
Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 260 (CA) 
109http://www.clerk.Parliament.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/71 EE96 l C-7DF9-4422-B8 l O-
CB3364A86C04/l 1288/20040615 .pdf <last accessed 17 June 2004>; see 
http://electionresources.org/nz/#2002 <last accessed 17 June 2004> 
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Based on the Parliamentary compositions of Singapore and New Zealand, it is 
submitted that 'entrenchment', as a procedural safeguard, would be much stronger in 
New Zealand than it is in Singapore. In Singapore, that procedural safeguard 1s 
exceedingly weak because of the skewed composition 11 0 of Parliament. 111 While. in 
theory the Constitution is still the 'supreme law of !he land', in rcalit). 1t can he 
amended as easily as BORA, which has the status or ordinar) leg:1 '.'ilauon .11 -
Conversely, attaining a two-thirds majority vote in New Zealand , though not 
impossible, would be a far more challenging task , owing to it s proportional pan1 
composition. 
It has been suggested that the People's Action Party (PAP) as the 0111 1 
government Singapore has known since independence has been the architect of the 
Constitution. 11 3 Attempts were made in the past, to install the custodial powers of the 
elected presidency as a two-key constitutional safeguard against Parliament' s 
intentions 11 4; unfortunately, this idea was quickly suspended by government, who 
sought to restrict the President's powers to non-constitutional Bill s. 
A one-party system differs from a dominant party system in that 111 the i"ormcr. 
a single political party holds an effective monopol y of power and control-, al'ccs -, tu 
government office. This may be provided either by law or \H1ttc11 1 ntu thl' 
Constitution; even where other parties exist, they have little or no effect on the course 
of events. 115 In this context, the procedural 'safeguard ' of ·special 111ajori1ies · for 
constitutional amendment is just about as powe1iul as a paper tiger. Furthermore. the 
110 There are 98 seats in Singapore's Parliament at present, of which 96 belong to the Peop le·~ Action 
Party and 2 belong to opposition parties. 
111 This is compounded by anti-party hopping legislation, article 46(2)(b), Republic of Singapore 
Constitution 1999 
11 2 It is interesting to note that the alternative suggestion of checks within Parliament itself has been a 
common theme in both countries. In the preliminary stages of drafting the Bill of Rights , it wa~ 
proposed in the White Paper that New Zealand should instate an upper house, instead of a supreme Bill 
of Rights, to serve as a check on Parliament. Similarly, in Singapore, the notion of extending the 
powers of the elected presidency to include final veto powers against the enactment of rights-
inconsistent legislation was proposed. Both these ideas eventually lost enthusia5m and beca me 
moribund . 
11 3 Thio Li-Ann, "Recent Constitutional Developments: Of Shadows and Whip~. Race. Rift ~ and 
Rights , Terrors and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs" (2002) SJLS 328, 330; Ke vin YL Tan . .. The 
Evolution of Singapore's Modern Constitution: Developments from 1945 to the Pre~e nt Da> ·· ( 1989 J I 
S Ac LJ 2, 6 - 17 
114 Article 22H(l) Constitution (Amendment No 3) Bill 1990 
115 Huntington SP and Moore CH, Authoritarian Politics in Modern Socie(v (Basic Books. London. 
1970) 
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lack of opposition MPs 116 in Parliament compounded by anti-party-hopping 
legislation 117 means that public policies are dictated rather than discussed. 
C The Case for and against Entrenchment 
It has been asserted, axiomatically that entrenchment, both in terms of 
procedural safeguards, and in substance, is a necessary feature of any constitution or 
Bill of Rights . This argument is best articulated in the well-known case of Marburv ,, 
Madison' 18, per John Marshall CJ 
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any 
legislative act repugnant to it ; or, that the legi slature may alter the constitution by an 
ordinary act. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution 
is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on level 
with ordinary legis lative acts, and , like other acts, is alterable when the legislature 
shall please to alter it ... If the latter part be true, then written constituti on~ are absurd 
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. It 
would be given to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same 
breath, which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing 
limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure. 
Conversely, the argument for entrenchment appears to stem solely from the 
fear of the tyranny of Parliament, if left unchecked, to pass laws .. against common 
right and reason, or repugnant , or impossible to be performed".
111
> The significance or 
English jurist Sir Edward Coke 's argument is that the principle of a fundamental lav, 
as a limitation upon government is involved and as its corollary, that the judges 
116 Of the 6 parties participating in the 2001 Elections, onl y 2 parties won I seat each in Parliament. 
leaving the rest of the 82 seats to the People's Action Party (PAP) htrp:/htra1tst11ne». a~1<1 I .L'tl ll1.\!!. / !!.e/ 
<last accessed 12 May 2004> 
117 Article 46(2)(b), Republic of Singapore Constitution, If an MP changes party he loses h1~ seat 1n 
Parliament 
11 8 See Marbury v Madison [1902] I Cranch 137 (Supreme Court, United States of' America) 
119 See Dr Bonham's Case [1610] 8 Co Rep 114, 118 (Court of Common Please, Eng land ), per Coke 
CJ, "And it appears in our books, that in many cases the Common Law wi ll ntrol Acts of Parl1amenl 
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament 1s against common nght 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Com mon Law will cont rol it and adjudge 
such Act to be void."; note that Coke dismissed the 8011ha111 principle as "obsolete" 111 AV Dicey. 
Introduction to the Study of th e Law of the Co11sti111tio11 , above note 49, 61 
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should be the sole interpreters of the fundamental law. 120 An entrenched Bill of Ri ght s 
protects minorities and disadvantaged groups against the tyranny of the majority by 
acting as a safeguard against an insidious or a casual erosion of rights . This point was 
well expressed in the White Paper (1985) on the Bill of Rights for New Zealand
121 
The power of the government, alone and through Parliament, without 
the restraint or even the day, which would come from a second chamber, is 
enormous. In some cases it can be compared with the power, claimed as well as 
actual, of the Stuart Kings before the revolution of the seventeenth century. The 
basic difference between then and now is of course the electorate. But the 
electorate's role cannot, in the usual case, be focused on a precise issue. A 
general election is a blunt instrument. It cannot give judgment on particular 
issues. 
The case against entrenchment, on the other hand , stems from the fear of the 
tyranny of the Judiciary 122, as unelected representatives of the will of the people, and 
its sole control over the common law development of fundamental freedoms through 
reading-down or reading-in limitations 123 to these inalienable rights. This can be 
largely attributed to the prevalence of the Westminster culture, which has foisted upon 
New Zealand's political culture the unshakeable belief that the traditional role of 
judges is to apply the laws passed by Parliament, not to pass judgment upon their 
reasonableness or otherwise. 124 
120See Patterson CP, "The Evolution of Constitutional ism" ( 1948) 32 Minnesota LR ...J.27 - ...J.5 7 
121 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper, A.6 Appendices to th e Jou ma I of th e House of 
Representatives, Wellington, 1985 at 27; See also Palmer Geoffrey, Bridled Power: Ne11 · Zealand 
Government under MMP (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1997) 264 - 277 
122 For counterarguments, see Cardozo B, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Pres~. 
New Haven, 1921) 141; "The stock argument against entrenching human rights is that it transfers 
power to non-elected judges." Lord Cooke of Thorndon, "The Role of Judges" in Building th e 
Constitution, above note 39, 375 
123 "Constitutional rights conferred without express limitation should not be cut down by reading 
implicit restrictions into them, so as to bring them into line with the common law", A-G 1· Moa,~i 
[1982] 2 BLR 124, 184 
124 Rishworth, "Reflections on the Bill of Rights after Quilter v Attorney-Genera/" (1998) NZ Law 
Review 683, 691-692 
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It has also been argued that having an entrenched Bill of Rights does not 
necessarily accord with democratic ideals because it prevents the minority voice or 
the individual citizen from being heard on issues of rights.
125 
In addition, the fear of entrenchment also stems from the fear or layin g dov\n a 
fossilized formulation of rights, which may lose its relevance for future generation:,, . It 
has been argued that the whole point of a written constitution is to lock in a part1cula1 
structure and make change very difficult; and further, that this is justifiable onl) 1 I
those doing the locking-in know what is best for later generations.
126 
The common ground in the arguments for and against entrenchment is the 
acknowledgment that the individual citizen requires special protection from the 
hegemonic State through the protection of his/her inalienable rights and freedoms; the 
divergence of opinion commences on the issue of whether the citizen's rights 
necessitate protection from Parliament or the Judiciary. 
Ultimately, the Jack of entrenchment of a Bill of Rights means the Courts 
cannot strike down an Act of Parliament as being unconstitutional . In a Westminster 
system of Parliamentary sovereignty, there is no institution higher than Parliament lL) 
serve as a check on Parliament. 127 
Arguably, there 1s no need for such a check in a system of parliamentary 
supremacy, since the safeguard of civil liberties is provided through open 
125 The reason given is that an entrenched Bi II of Rights effectively gives judges sole power to decide 
Rights issues, rather than Parliament. See Waldron J, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights ' 
(Spring 1993) at 358 
126 Allen J, "No to a Written Constitution" in Building the Constitution, above note 39,374 
127 'This is a mythical and false assumption in the context of the modern day pluralist soc iety. ot o nl y 
does the parliamentary executive control Parliament through the vehicle of the party system. the 
mandate wielded by the parliamentary majority is at best imperfect and temporal. Judic ial re view leap~ 
into the fray as an important countermajoritarian check. It is the method by which fundamental 
constitutional values 'trump' the short term values embodied in legislation. Historicall y, judicial re viev. 
arose as a response to the post-Holocaust fear that laws as evil as those contained in Nazi edicts mi ght 
be promulgated without check by the legislature." Thio Li-Ann, 'Trends in Constitutional 
Interpretation: Oppugning Ong, Awakening Arumugam?" SJLS (1997) 257 
10 
participatory democratic elections.
128 Ultimately, this is an expression of faith in the 
hypothetical internal checks available within an "illimitable" Parliament.
129 
D The Normative Role of the Judiciary 
The common law embodies a philosophy, which respects the dignity and 
liberty of individuals. 130 As TRS Allan notes: 
The Rule of Law, as a juristic principle, thus embodies the liberal and 
individualistic bias of the common law in favor of the citizen. It transcend~ the 
principle of legality by authorizing and demanding, an attitude of independence 
and skepticism on the part of the judges in the face of claims of government 
power131 
128 "The open, fully participatory, referendum process in which each voter's say counts as much a, any 
other's is the one I prefer. Until such time as the maj ority of New Zealanders want fundamental 
constitutional change, it should not happen. On such matters as a written constitut ion I hope it never 
happens." Allen J, "No to a Written Constitution" in Building tlie Constitution, above note 39. 395: 
Conversely, "The stock argument against entrenching human rights is that it transfer, power to non-
elected judges. In the eyes of those who have come to favor entrenchment, and in widespread 
international opinion, this misses the point. The protection of minority rights is a key element of 
democracy. There are certain basic rights of membership of a national society, which should not be 
capable of being overridden by a bare majority. Minority rights shou ld not depend on the pleasure of 
the majority. Non-elected judges are an essential insurance against the dictation of the majority. Which 
means that the judges bear a heavy responsi bi I ity and that the best methods of their ~election m u,t he· 
assiduously sought. Balanced courts are as crucial as balanced rights. But. unle,, une of the pararnuun1 
tasks of the courts is to enforce human rights, the position can resemble that in the former Sn, ,et 
Union: high-sounding promulgation of the rights, largel y meani ngl e~~ a, J udic1al enforcement II a, 
excluded" Lord Cooke ofThorndon, "The Role of Judges" in Building tlie Co1witutw11 . abl)le nrne 3l). 
375 
129 For example, the primary convention that Parliament will not legislate for tyran111cal or oppre,,11 e 
purposes is problematic because what is tyrannical or oppress ive involves subjective evaluation . There 
is no consensus on what these terms mean, or whether, in any case, Parliament ha, over,teppecl the 
bounds of propriety, see Joseph P, Constitutional and Ad111i11istratil'e Lrm in Nell' Zealand. (2 eel. 
Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 290; A less ambiguous convention is that Parliament shou ld not pass 
legislativejudgments interfering with the administration ofj ustice. see SA de Smith and R Bnmer. 
Constitutional and Ad111i11istrative Law (8 ed, Penguin Books, London, 1998) 366: The C' lutha 
Development (Clyde Dam) Empowering Act 1982 was arguably unconstituti onal a, being 111 breach of 
this convention. This Act reversed a decision reached by due process of law through the Planning 
Tribunal and High Court and denied the successful litigants the fruits of judicial victory. see Palmer 
Geoffrey, Unbridled Power (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland. 1987) 196 - 198 
130 Rutter MF, The Future of the Co111111on Law, in Th e Applicable Law in Singapore and Mail/\ ·s1a: A 
Guide to the Reception, Precedent and th e Sources of Law in the Republic of Singapore and the 
Federation of Malaysia 575 (1989), 574 
131 Allan TRS, "Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionali,m''. 
(1985) 44 Cambridge L.J. 111 , 119 
Therefore, the normative approach is that Courts have an interpretative 
monopoly. 132 Central to arguments of advocates for the strengthening of the 
interpretive function of a Bill of Rights, otherwise known as the 'common law model ' 
is the assertion that this implies no strong challenge to parliamentary sovereignty . 
133 
However, it is submitted that a limited qualification of legislative power in the 
safeguard of rights is both an inevitable corollary and a necessity. 
134 Further, this 
should not be seen as an undesirable consequence. A Bill of Rights ought to provide 
some form of procedural safeguard, however minute, against statist incursions into 
minority rights. 
The distrust of judges is exaggerated. The doctrine of purposive interpretation, 
and the cardinal principle of the rule of law and natural justice
135 restrain "j udicial 
activism" of the sort expressed in the Parliamentary White paper
136
, as enunciated by 
Cardozo 137 
A judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free . He is not to innovate at 
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own idea of 
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw inspiration from consecrated principles. 
Nonetheless, in relation to BORA, the independence of the Judiciary is not 
enough; since section four of BORA expressly restrains the Courts from over-ruling 
rights-inconsistent legislation . 
Conversely, section three of BORA expressly stipulates that the Act upplie~ to 
the legislature, executive and judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand, or 
132 Allan TRS , "The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or 
Interpretative Inquiry?" (2002) C.L.J. 87, 102 
133Craig P, "Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and Supremacy" (2003) Public Lrn 92. 107 -
108 
134Allen TRS, "The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or 
Interpretive Inquiry?" above note 130, 94 
135 In the discharge of their judicial duties, judges are bound by the requirement~ of natural JU~tJce at 
common law and under BORA s. 3, s. 27(1) 
136 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper, A.6 Appendices to the Joumal of the House of 
Representatives, Wellington, 1985; "The fears expressed in the mid- I 980s were than an entrenched B ii I 
of Rights would transform our courts into political institutions by empowering them to overrule 
Parliament or government action and that this involved substantial risk." Palmer, Geoffrey, Bridled 
Power: New Zealand Government under MMP (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 266 - 267 
137 B Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Ya le University Press, ew Haven, 1921) I-+ I 
any other person, or body in performance of public function , power or dut y confen-ed 
or imposed by law; the implication being, that it was intended to restrain the powers 
of government from unduly wresting the inalienable rights of the indi vidua!.
138 
The Diceyan doctrine that Parliament is illimitable to the ex tent th at it cannot 
even bind its own successors is fallacious, as di scussed earli er, .. if the doc trine or 
parliamentary sovereignty involves the attribution of unrestri cted power to parl iament, 
the dogma is no better than a legal fiction"
139 
E The Purposive Approach to Rights 
1. Principle 
The fear that entrenchment would freeze the ambit of fundamental liberties 
rather than extend them, as a result of stricter amendment procedures, is misguided. 
The argument follows that by not entrenching the Bill of Rights 
140 
[Rights] are capable of developme nt. There is roo m fo r experiment , fo r pushing 
the boundaries against discrimination wider. If the movement goes too fa r, 
legislation can step in and set narrower lines. 
The fallacy of this argument is exposed by the legal principle of purposi ve 
interpretation , which governs constitutional interpretation. 
14 1 As elaborated by Lord 
Wilberforce in Fisher142, the purposive approach calls for "a generous interpretation 
avoiding what has been called ' the austerity of tabulated legalism,' suitable to give to 
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms refen-ed to." 
138 See G Palmer, Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP, 2 ed (Auc kland , Oxford 
University Press, 1977) 264, " [BORA] begun its li fe as a constitutio nal sledge- hammer, but in its fin al 
form it did not give to the courts power to strike down legis latio n inco nsistent with it. " 
139 Dicey AV, Introduction to the Study of the La w of the Constirution, above note 49, 71 
140 Tollemache Nadja, Th e Proposed Bill of Rig/11s: A Discussion and Resource Paper prepared for Tile 
Human Rights Comission (March 1986) 65 
141 On constitutional interpretation generally, see Chester James Antieau, Consrir111io11a/ Co 11 srrncrw11 
(Oceana Publications , New York 1982) 
142 Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [ 1980] AC 3 I 9, 328. 
2. New Zealand 
The purposive approach better conforms to the Long Title or the 81 II ol 
Rights, which states that the purpose of the Act is to affirm, protect and promote 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand and has been affirmed by 
the Court of Appeal in various decisions. 143 
A purposive approach allows for the growth and development of constitutional 
rights in tandem with social change, as elaborated by Dickson J in the Canadian case 
of Hunter v Southam 144 
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of 
construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and ob ligation~. It i~ ea~il) 
enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye 
to the future. 
Canadian common law has consistently affirmed the purposive approach a~ 
well. 145 This is significant because the BORA was in large measure , drawn from the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, therefore "Canadian decisions can be 
expected to assist in interpretation so long as there is borne in mind the different 
status enjoyed by the Charter" 146 
143 See Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [ 1991] I ZLR -139 . -1-10; I l 990- 9::! I l NZBORR I 
(CA), Minist,y of Transport v Noorr, above note 52,282; (1992) 8 CRNZ l 1-1; l ZBORR 97 (CA) at 
268 (Cooke P) and 292 (Gault J), R v Goodwin I 1993] 2 NZLR 153 (CA) 168 (Cooke P), and R 1· Te 
Kira I 1993] 3 NZLR 257 (CA) 26 l (Cooke P) 
144 Hunter v Southam (1984] 2 S.C.R. 14, 155 per Dickson J "The task of expounding a constitution i~ 
crucially different from that of construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It 
is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. 
Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power 
and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and 
liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore. be 
capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and histoncal realllles often 
unimagined by its framers. The Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, 111 1nterpret1ng Its 
provisions, bear these considerations in mind." 
145 "This Court has on numerous occasions stated that the proper approach to interpreting the meaning 
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter is to adopt a purposive analysis" Hunter v 
Southam Inc. (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 11 D.L.R. (4 th) 641, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 145; R v Big M Drug Marr 
Ltd (1985) 18 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 18 D.L.R. (4 th) 321, l S.C.R. 295; R v Brydg es (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 
340 
146 MOT v Noort, above note 52, 292 per Richard J 
34 
Judicial interpretations of the law must always defer to clear expressions of 
Parliamentary intent. However, judicial craft is such that judges can often find enough 
ambiguity and lack of clarity in statutes to permit them to bring the statutes into line 
with the judges' understanding of the spirit of the common law. 147 In this context, the 
approach of purposive interpretation further mandates the Judiciary to give full effect 
to rights and freedoms, regardless of the status of the Bi II of Rights 148 
The fundamental freedoms affirmed in BORA are to be given full effect and are 
not to be narrowly construed. Its provisions are to be construed to ensure its 
objects of protecting and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. It 
is a statute, not an entrenched constitutional document , but it is couched in broad 
terms requiring interpretation appropriate to these objects 
Therefore, the adoption of the purposive approach by the courts in Ne'v\ 
Zealand is indicative of two facts - firstly, that wirhour entrenchment. the court s in 
New Zealand will continue to make good use of the interpretive function of BORA Lo 
read-in constitutional principles into common law, rather than our; Secondly. that the 
fear that the entrenchment of BORA would lead to a fossilization of rights in-elevanl 
to the next generation is misguided. Rights are not static, but evolutionary and capable 
of growth with the times. 
More importantly, it is the spi1it of BORA, which has had direct application to 
common law in New Zealand. In her decision at first instance, Elias J gave perhaps 
the clearest judicial recognition to that effect 149
 
In my view, BORA protections are to be given effect by the Court in applying 
the common law ... The application of the Act to the co mmon la w see ms to me 
to follow from the language of s 3, which refers to acb of the Jud1c1al branL·h ,> I 
the Government of New Zealand. a prov ision not to be found 1n the Canadian 
Charter. .. BORA is important contemporary legislati on . which 1~ direct I> 
relevant to the policies served by the common law of defamation. It 1~ idle to 
suggest that the common law need not conform to the judgements in such 
147 Dyzenhaus David , "Rethinking the Process/S ubstance Di stincti on: Baker v Canada·· l lnl\ er,11> ul 
Toronto Law Journal (Summer, 2001) 193, 197 
148 MOT v Noori, above note 52 , 292 
149 Lange v Atkinson [ 1997] 2 NZLR 22, 32 (HC) 
legislation. They are authoritative as to where the convenience and welfare of 
society lies. 
15 
It has been recognized that the status of BORA is not only comparable to 
ordinary legislation, but in fact, it is the weakest piece of legislation in the legal 
framework owing to section four
150
. It is a statute that loses to all other pieces of 
legislation; it does not even impliedly repeal existing legislation with which it is 
inconsistent. Nonetheless, by virtue of the doctrine of purposive interpretation , which 
the Courts adopt, the function of BORA is expanded slightly beyond its educative 
role. 
3. Singapore 
In Singapore, the purposive approach to rights is, in w1iting, accepted by the 
Courts to be adopted approach in interpreting the Constitution to give effect to the 
intent and will of Parliament.
151 However, the principle as set out in Fisher
152
, is 
drastically refurbished in the Singaporean context
153 
The principle to be applied is that the words of the Act are to be read in their 
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with 
the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament. 
The intention is to be found at the time that the law was enacted or in some 
circumstances when it subsequently reaffirms the particularly statutory provision , as 
evident from the Interpretation Act
154
. Nonetheless, case law has shown that in 
dealing with the fundamental rights, the approach adopted is nor the Fisher
155 
150 Section four BORA, 'Other Enactments not Affected', above note 2 
151 See Constitutional Reference Nol of 1995 (1995] 2 SLR 201 (Constitution of Singapore Tribunal) 
per Yong Pung How CJ 
152 Minister of Ho111e Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 328. 
153 Driedger EA, Construction of Statutes (2 ed, 1983) 87 (as quoted in) Consti tutional Reference No I 
of 1995 [1995] 2 SLR 201 (Constitution of Singapore Tribunal) per Yong Pung How CJ 
154 section 9A Interpretation Act (Cap l ), which sta tes: "( l ) an interpretation tha1 would prnmute the 
purpose or object underlying the written law (whether the purpose or obJect 1~ expre~~I) ~tated 111 the 
written law or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpo~e or 
object" 
155 Minister of Horne Affairs v Fisher, above note 151, 328. 
approach, but one which, places national interest as paramount, per Yong Pung Hov. 
CJI56 
The Constitution is primarily to be interpreted within its own four wall ~ and not 
in light of the analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain, the 
United States of America or Australia 
In tandem with the move to be more assertive in the development of local 
ju1isprudence, the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A) 157 seeks to delineate the 
extent to which English law is applicable in Singapore. This mandates the Coun·s 
adoption of a dialogical 158 approach to English case law. This approach allO\\ s the 
Courts to look to foreign cases selectively, based on the "four walls" approach , which 
suggests, constitutional law is often regarded as sui generis , calling for a unique 
interpretive approach. 
Yet another example of the selective use of foreign constitutional cases can be 
seen in the case of Jabar v PP 159 , a Court of Appeal case involving a constitutional 
challenge to a delay in imposing the death penalty. After reviewing and distinguishing 
the jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court and Privy Council (on appeal from 
Jamaica) based on a detailed analysis of their reasoning and respective constitutional 
texts, the Court of Appeal adopted, without further analysis of reasoning or 
constitutional text, the decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 
in Richmond v Lewis 160 . 
Furthermore, the guideline to "purposive interpretation", in Singapore, as 
outlined in section 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1), adopts an interpretation that 
156 Chan Hiang Le11g Colin & Ors v PP [1994J 3 SLR 662 (HC) The issue here was whether the 
Minister's decision to de-register the Jehovah 's Witnesses as a society violated article J 5 of the 
Constitution, citing State of Ke/a11tan v Federatio11 of Malaysia (1963] MLJ 355, 358. 
157 Which came into force on 12 November 1993 
158 "It is important to distinguish courts' use of foreign cases , which might involve merely citing them, 
from their engaging with and applying them. There is no question that the Singapore courts use foreign 
cases, as the foregoing discussion has shown. What is less clear is the extent to which the courts engage 
with these cases (the essence of the dialogical approach), let alone apply them, say, as 'persuasive 
authority", See Ramraj V, "Comparative Constitutionalisms: The Remaking of Constitutional Orders in 
South-East Asia" 6 Sing J Int'l & Comp. L. 302; Also see Glenn HP, "Persuasive Authority" (1987) 
32 McGill LJ 261 
159 (1995] I SLR 617 
160 Richmond v Lewis (1990] 948 F2d 1473 
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promotes the purpose or object underlying the written law by looking at extrinsic 
material, inter alia, the explanatory statement of the Bill and parliamentary record or 
debates. Given the People's Action Party's (PAP) dominance of Parliament. the 
purposive approach is really more of a political tool, than a shield for rights.161 
The paradox of the "purposive approach" adopted in Singapore, is that it is 
really a literalist approach, which accords primacy to the intent of the legi slative 
drafters, rather to substantive values such as the intrinsic dignity or the individual. 
Such a literalist approach wrests from the equation, a substantive safeguard to 
fundamental rights and liberties. Nonetheless, in the scheme of an entrenched Bill or 
Rights, the Judiciary is well placed to strike down rights-inconsistent legislation , by 
virtue of the primacy of the Constitution. However, as this paper will show, such an 
approach has not been widely embraced by the Courts in Singapore. In its place , the 
communitarian ethos of Confucianism, and the paramountcy of national security 
interests have been invoked - resulting in an unwamrnted "Statist legalism" - hoth 
procedural and substantive conceptions of the rule of law being construed to sen c the 
interests of the executive and ultimately, the State, over the individual. 
IV FUNCTION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
A Judicial Review and the Power to Strike Down 
1. New Zealand 
Judicial review and the power to strike down (constitutionally inconsistent 
legislation) stems from this notion of constitutional supremacy, as set out in Marlmr,· 
v Madison. 162 Judicial review arose as a response to the promulgation or nght:-,-
inconsistent laws during the world wars of the twentieth century. 161 The absence or 
161 Tan Eugene Kheang, "Laws and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way" Ho ng Kong L,m 
Journal (2000) 91, 97 
162 Marbury v Madison, l Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) 
163 
" ... the nineteenth century was heavily influenced by positivist thought , which feared an y attempt by 
the Judiciary to impose higher or constitutional standards on ordinary legislation. The popular 
legislature was seen as the only source of law, and its statutes were to control all cases brought before 
the courts. When the Nazi-Fascist era shook this faith in the legislature, people began to reconsider the 
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this 'striking-down' power was the Human Rights Committee's first objection to the 
BORA. 164 However, it has been observed that even in legal systems where the power 
to strike-down is available, this power is hardly used. In the United States and 
Canada, where courts have the power to invalidate legislation , "bad" rules stay on the 
books unless and until they are squarely and successfully challenged in the courts. 165 
As such, the focus should not be on what is possible by way of a rights regime, but 
rather a question of what is the constitutional practice - does the legis lature routinely 
pass laws that are an affront to human 1ights? 166 
It has been suggested that in New Zealand, we have a Judiciary who are 
beginning to assert what had been thought of as a long obsolete power of judicial 
review and have done this without the assistance of a Bill of Ri ghts. 167 As cited in the 
White Paper, per Cooke J 168 
I do not think that literal compulsion, by torture for instance, would be within the 
lawful powers of Parliament. Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that 
even Parliament could not override them 
Whether the above observation is true or false, in law, the power to strike 
down inconsistent legislation is not within the ambit of BORA.169 This is true or 
enactments 170 passed before or after the commencement of BORA. 
Judiciary as a check against legislative disregard of principles once considered immutable. They began. 
in a sense, to 'positivize ' these principles, to put them in written fo rm and to provide legal barriers 
against their violation." Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial RevielV in the Co11te111porary World. ( I ed. Bobbs-
Merrill , Indianapolis, 1971 ) 118 
164 The second objection of the Human Rights Committee to the New Zealand Bill of Right~ wa~ its 
inability to grant remedies to individuals, because remedies depend on the ability of coum to 1nqtl1date 
rules . 
165 Mclean Janet, "Legislative Invalidation, Human Rights Protection and s. 4 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act" (2001) NZLR 421,425 
166 Mclean Janet, Legislative In validation, Hu111a11 Rights Protection and s. 4 of the Nell' Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act, above note 164,426 
167 Tollemache Nadja, The Proposed Bill of Rights: A Discussion and Resource Paper prepared for 1he 
Human Rights Commission (March 1986) 66 
168 
Taylor v NZ Poultry Board (1984) NZLR 394,398 per Cooke J. See A Bill ofRigh1sfor NeH 
Zealand: A White Paper (New Zealand. Parliament. House of Representative~. 1985. AJHR. A6J para 
7.16 
169 Section four of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above note 2 
17° For the definition of 'regulations' ee Interpreiation Act 1999. ~ 29; a~ 10 the l111cqm:1a111>11 \l't 
definition of "enactment" applying to that term as it 1s used in BORA. ~ee Dn.:11 1 , \ 1101111·1 - (,', •11, /(/ / 
12002) I NZLR 58, 73; (2001) 18 CRNZ465; 6 HRNZ 368 (CA) at 383. "Act' ' mean~ an ,\L·t ol the 
Parliament of New Zealand or of the General Assembly; and includes an Imperial Act that, ~ pan ,11 till' 
law of New Zealand: lnterpretation Act 1999, ~ 29, definition of "Act". 
2. Singapore 
In Singapore, while the constitution provides for judicial power to be vested in 
the judiciary, it usually does not provide that the Courts have the authority to make 
pronouncements on the constitutionality of statutes passed by the legislature. 
Nonetheless, this authority is to be found in the inherent power of the court, and it is 
asserted by the Courts themselves. 171 
Significantly, judicial review and the power to strike-down have been 
furthered watered down in critical areas of law 172 by constitutional amendments made 
by Parliament. The Judiciary's single attempt at striking down unconstitutional 
enactments was legislatively over-ruled by Parliament. 173 In a landmark judgment, the 
Court of Appeal in Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home Affairs174 quashed a preventive 
detention order issued under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which confeJTed broad, 
intrusive powers on the Minister of Home Affairs to authorize detention orders 
curtailing the constitutionally guaranteed right to personal liberty. 175 This led to the 
amendment of section 8B(2), Internal Security Amendment Act (Act 2 of 1989)
176
, 
which reads 
There shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or decision made by 
the President or the Minister under the provision of this Act save in regard to any 
question relating to the compliance with any procedural requirement of this Act 
governing such act or decision. 
171 Tan, Yeo and Lee, Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore (2 ed, Butterworths, Asia, 1997) 
331 
172 For example, preventive detention under the Internal Security Amendment Act (Ac t 2 of l 989) and 
the Minister's discretion to curb religious freedom, Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap 
167A)s8,s 18 
173 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1989 (No I of l 989) which came into 
effect on 27 January I 989 
174 Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Hol!le Affairs [1989] l MLJ 69 
175 For a critical analysis of the operation of judicial review in Singapore, see Thio Li-Ann, Trends in 
Constitutional Interpretation: Oppugning Ong, A wakening Arunwga111? ( 1997) SJLS 240 - 290 
176 For the reasons behind the amendment, see Singapore Par/ia111enta1y Debaies, 25 January 1989, 
Second Reading, Internal Security (Amendment Bill) cols 531-533; 463-474. 
.l(j 
Subsequent cases have affirmed the legality of the above provision in 
excluding judicial review in respect of detention orders. 177 The existence or the IS A 
empowers Parliament to enact rights-inconsistent legislation. Therefore , while there 1'> 
a 'striking-down' power, as well as a power of judicial review conferred on the 
Judiciary within the Constitution of Singapore, in reality, the power:, of revie\.\ arc 
limited to aspects of procedural impropriety rather than substantive fairness and 
natural justice. 
The constitutionality of the ISA amendment, challenged in the subseq uen t 
High Court case of Teo Soh Lung 178 was perfunctorily ignored by the High Court. 
who simply reaffirmed the legitimacy of the new law 179 . This is an affront to natural 
justice, which is based on the principles of the right to a fair hearing (audi a/1era111 
partem), and the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua). Secondly, the new 
amendment, which in application freezes statutory law to an earlier date 180 • creates 
law, which is in essence, retrospective - this is an affront to the rule of law . 181 
177 
Teo Soh Lung v Minister/or Home Affairs [1989] 2 MU 449 and Vincenr Cheng v Minisrerfor 
Home Affairs [1990] l MU 449; See Yee, Ho & Seng, "Judicial Review of Preventive Detention under 
the ISA" (1989) 10 Sing LR 66. 
178 Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs [1989] 2 MU 449 and Vincenl Cheng v Minisrer for 
Home Affairs [1990] l MLJ 449; See Yee, Ho & Seng, "Judicial Review of Preventive Detention under 
the ISA" (1989) 10 Sing LR 66. 
179 "Section 8B(l) clearly lays down clearly lays down the subjective test applies to the exercise of the 
powers pursuant toss 8 and 10 of the ISA and s 8B(2) provides that there is to be judicial review only 
in regard to any question relating to compliance with any procedural requirement of the ISA governing 
such act or decision", per Chua J, Teo Soh Lung v Minister/or Home Affairs, above note 177,449 
180 Section 8B(a) ISA provides, "Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the law governing the 
judicial review of any decision made or act done in pursuance of any power conferred upon the 
President or the Minister by the provisions of this Act shall be the same as was applicable and declared 
in Singapore on the 13 th day of July 1971; and no part of the law before, on o r after that date or any 
other country in the Commonwealth relating to judicial review shall apply. 
181 "( !) All laws should be prospective, open and clear ... (2) Laws should be relati ve ly stable .. . (3) the 
making of particular laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, c lear and general 
rules", Raz Joseph, 'The Rule of Law and Its Virtue' ( I 977) 93 LQR 195, I 96; also Fuller also tleshe~ 
out his idea of procedural law by explaining what would constitute a violation, ·'When a sys tem ca lling 
itself law is predicated upon a general disregard by judges of the terms of the laws they purport to 
enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal irregularities, even the grossest, by retroactive 
statutes, when it has only to resort to forays of terror in the streets, which no one dares challenge, in 
order to escape even those scant restraints imposed by the pretence of legality--when all these things 
have become true of a dictatorship, it is not hard for me, at least, to deny to it the name of law." Fuller 
Lon, "Positivism And Fidelity To Law: A Reply To Professor Hart" ( 1958) 71 Harv L Rev 630,660 
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In one fell swoop, the Courts have discarded both procedural and substantive 
safeguards provided for by an entrenched, supreme Constitution. 182 
B The Interpretive Function 
1. BORA Section Six 
Aside from the function of a Bill of Rights to invalidate legislation. 1t also 
possesses an interpretive function. In New Zealand, this interpretive function i~ 
vital 183 owing to its inability to invalidate legislation. This interpretive function is well 
set out in section six of BORA, which states 18 .. 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the right;, and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights , that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning. 
The threshold of 'inconsistency' can be found in section five of BORA, which 
sets out justified limitations, on the basis that rights are not absolute. The Court need 
only find an interpretation, which amounts to a 'reasonable' limit. justifiable in a free 
and democratic society. 185 Once consideration has been given to section five. section 
six requires a Court to adopt the interpretation of a statutory provision that place~ the 
least possible limitation on a guaranteed right or freedom 186 , as set out by the Court ol 
Appeal in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review. 
187 
182 See Jabar v PP [1995] I Sing. L. R. 617 (CA) held , "Any law, which provides fo r the depri\'at1on of 
a person's life or personal liberty is valid and binding so long as it is validly passed by Parliament. The 
court is not concerned with whether it is also fair, just and reasonable as well" 
183 The query was made that if full incorporation (of the Bill of Rights) was rejected , at lea;, t for the 
time being, the issue follows as to the content of an interpretative Bill. See Lord Cooke of Thorndon . 
"Mechanisms For Entrenchment And Protection Of A Bill of Rights: The New Zealand Experience" 
(1997) 4 EHRLR 5, 490-495 
184 Section six of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 
185 See generally, The Laws of New Zealand (B utterworth) Human Righb. Part l (--1 ) para --1'.2 
186 It is important to note that the dicta set out by the CourI of Appeal 1n Moonen. need no1 nece~~ar il :, 
be followed. See, The Laws of New Zealand (B utterworth ) Human R1 ghb, Pan l t --1 ) pa1 a -L~ 
187 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Revie11• [2002] 2 NZLR 754; ('.200:2/ 6 l !RN/ 623 ( ( 'r\ l 
2. The Strength of BORA Section Six 
While it has been argued that the Courts in New Zealand have taken a robust 
approach to human rights 188 , the same cannot be said of the Courts ' approach to 
BORA itself. It is submitted that the potential of section six of BORA, which sets out 
the interpretive function of the Bill of Rights, is stymied by section four of BORA; 
section four prevails because of the lack of entrenchment and supremacy of BORA. 
The approach taken by the Courts of New Zealand to section six of BORA has 
sidelined the role of the Bill of Rights . Firstly, if there is another basis for holding that 
an enactment is impliedly repealed or revoked, or otherwise rendered invalid or 
ineffective, other than due to its inconsistency with BORA, the fact that it is also 
inconsistent with BORA does not prevent a Court from holding it to be impliedl y 
repealed or revoked, or otherwise invalid. 189 Secondly, with regards to regulations , if 
the relevant regulation-making power is capable of being interpreted so as to 
authorize the making of BORA-inconsistent regulations 190, the BORA cannot 
invalidate any inconsistent regulations passed under it. In such a case the regulations 
would be unlawful not by reason of their inconsistency with BORA, but rather by 
reason of their inconsistency with the statutory regulation-making power, as 
interpreted consistently with BORA. 191 
The status of BORA as ordinary legislation is in large part , the reason for thi s 
cursory regard to a document , which should in fact be regarded as the fundamental 
law of the land. Furthermore, owing to section four, BORA in its conception, is in 
fact, the weakest piece of legislation in the legal framework. 192 It is a statute that loses 
to all other pieces of legislation; it does not even impliedly repeal existing legi slati on 
with which it is inconsistent. 
188 Mclean Janet, Leg islative /11 validatio11 , Hui/Ian Rig/it s Protection and s . ./- of the Neil' Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act (2001] NZLR, 436 
189 See Drew v Attorney -General (200211 NZLR 58; (2001 ) 18 CRNZ 465; 6 HRNZ 368 (CA); The 
Laws of New Zealand (Butterworth) Human Rights , Part I (4) para 43 
190 Section four of the New Zealand Bill of Ri ghts Act 1990, above note 2 
191 See Drew v Attorney-General [2002] l NZLR 58 at 73; (200 1) 18 CRNZ -t65; 6 HRNZ 368 (CA); 
The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths) Human Rights, Part I (4) para 43 
192 Section four BORA, above note 2 
.I, 
It has been suggested that for a court to delve into issues of justifiability and/or 
reasonableness of statutory provisions is an illegitimate waste of judicial resources , 
because it is irrelevant to the ultimate resolution of a legal dispute, for e,·en I r a 
statutory provision unjustifiably limits BORA rights, section four mean s that it 1s 
nonetheless the law and must be applied by the judges. 193 
C. Some Conclusions 
In Singapore, judicial review on substantive grounds has been great! y 
narrowed through constitutional amendments and the enactment of ouster clauses 
194. 
Where mjnisterial discretion is exercised in a manner that is 'arbitrary and 
untrammeled', the Courts may intercede to uphold natural justice. As such, the 
wording of Part IV of the Constitution itself provides no standards aside from 
procedural limjts, which might constrain legislative power, 195 resulting in the death of 
the interpretive function of Part IV of the Constitution. 
One should not discount the interpretive function of a Bill of Rights 196_ nder 
all constitutional regimes that give courts power to strike down legislation, an 
interpretive remedy is preferred on the presumption that interpretation is less intrusive 
on the legislative branch of government. 197 The issue then is, can the interpretive 
function of BORA be strengthened without the need for entrenchment of the Bill 
itself. The next part of this paper furnishes a normative framework of how this can be 
done. 
193 Butler Andrew S, "Judicial Indications oflnconsistency- A New Weapon in the Bill of Rights 
Armoury?" 2000 NZ Law Review 43, 53 
194 
See Thio Li-Ann, Trends in Constitutional Interpretation: Oppug11ing Ong, Awakening 
Arumugam? ( 1997) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 243 
195 
In Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs [ 1989] 2 MLJ 449, per Chua J at -l57I --l5 8A: "It i~ 
erroneous to contend that the rule of law has been abolished by legislation and that Parliament ha:, 
stated its absolute and conclusive judgment in applications for judicial review or o ther action:, . 
Parliament has done no more than to enact the rule of law relating to the law applicable to judicial 
review." The judge in the subsequent case of Vi11cent Cheng v Minister for Hom e Affairs JI 990J I MLJ 
449 adopted Chua J's judgment in Teo 
196 The President of the Court of Appeal described section six as "one of the key features" of BORA. 
Ministry of Transport v Noort (1992] 3 NZLR 260,272; (1992) 8 CRNZ 114; I NZBORR 97 (CA), per 
Cooke P 
197 Mclean Janet, Legislative Invalidatio11, Human Rights Protection and s. 4 of th e New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act (2001) NZLR, 428 
V NATURE OF RIGHTS 
"It is both an exciting time and a confusing time to be a c ivil liberties lawyer" 198 
A The Context of Rights 
Rights are principles of deep and pervasive concern. 199 Ri ghts do not ex ist in u 
vacuum but compete with conflicting interests in any given soc iety. A legal ri ght th,tt 
finds protection in a Bill of Rights finds it under the auspices or some canoni ca l form 
of words in which the provisions of the charter are enunci ated. 200 When rights find 
statutory expression in a Bill of Rights, or an entrenched constituti on, they are neither 
absolute nor literal guarantees. The nature of rights necess itates the striking of a 
"constitutional bargain"20 1 between an indi vidual liberty and the ri ght of the 
community to enjoy the preservation of potentially competing communit y interes ts in 
public order, health and morality. The "constitutional bargain" is large ly determined 
by culture; and illegitimately by politics. The responsibility then fa ll s either to the 
Judiciary or to Parliament to make this determination for society, depending on 
whether the Bill of Rights is entrenched, or non-entrenched. 
Raz, in considering the relation between the rul e of law and other va lues the 
Jaw should serve, exhorts that202 "it is of parti cular importance to re member that the 
rule of law is essentially a negative value. It is merel y designed to minimi ze the harm 
to freedom and dignity, which the Jaw may cause in pursuit of its goals" 
In this part, the analysis of rights protection in New Zeal and and Singapore 
will focus specifically on freedom of expression .203 This rights di scourse will be 
198 Whitty N, Murphy T , and Livingston S , Civil Liberties Law: The H11111an Rights Act Era 
(Butterworths, London, 2001 ) v. 
199 See Waldron J, 'A Ri ght-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights' (Spring 1993) 
200 See Waldron J, 'A Ri ght-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights ' (Spring I 993) 
20 1 Tan, Yeo and Lee, Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore (2 ed, Butterworths, Asia, 1997) 
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202 Raz, 'The Rule of Law and Its Virtue ' (1977) 93 LQR 195 , 196 
203 "The subject of civil liberties is best viewed as being co ncerned with those freedoms, which are 
essential to the maintenance and fostering of our representati ve government", See Fe ldman David, 
Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2 ed, Oxford Uni versity Press. Oxford. :20W) 
Part II 
premised on the assumptions that (1) rights are inalienable ; (2) rights are not absolute. 
but qualified; (3) rights are not universal, but relative. 
I. Freedom of Expression 
In principle, freedom of expression is important in promoting open discussion 
to the discovery of truth, and protecting freedom of conscience. 20 .. However, 
democratic ideals necessitate justifiable limits upon freedom of expression where they 
conflict with the rights of others. The balance must be attained between the 
importance of free speech as an integral aspect of every individual's right to self-
development and fulfillment, and its harmful effects on society - the justification !'or 
censorship laws. 205 
As enunciated by JS Mills, " o law should prevent the existence of the free 
will of the individual, without good cause". From this statement of principle, one ma; 
conclude that the exercise of right entails, reasonable restraints. "good cause" or 
'justifiable limitations' . Concededly, some regulation of the free speech market-place 
may be considered, if any expression is to be effective. However, it is noteworthy that 
government intervention should always be minimal, if only enough to prevent hate 
speech, and speech that may incite violence - any more would serve as an obstacle 
towards the discovery of truth, and the exercise of one's freedom of conscience.1°6 
2. Justifiable Limitations 
The utilitarian calculation of the concept of justifiable limitati ons pro\ ides that 
guarantees in a Bill of Rights are representations of the ongoing conflicts bet\\ een the 
individual and the State; they are not in terms, the resolution of them. 207 It is at this 
juncture that two observations may be made - firstly, that the balance bemeen 
individual rights and social cost require constant fine-tuning; second ly. that the 
204 Thio Li-Ann, "An ' i' for an I", (1998) 9 Ind . Int ' l & Comp. L. Rev. 259 
205 Barendt Eric, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 8 
206 Barendt Eric, Freedom of Speech, see note 204, 12 
207 Joseph PA, Co11stitllfio11al and Ad111i11istrmive La1v i11 Ne1v Zea/a11d, above. nOLe 10. 1036 
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balance to be struck would be unique to each society. As expressed by the High 
Court in R v Mallison208 
BORA is not a technical document. It has to be applied in our society in a 
realistic way. The question is whether what was done gave practical effect in the 
particular circumstances to the rights protected by the particular guarantee, here 
s. 23(l)(b). And anyone complaining of a breach of the BORA must, as the 
Canadian Courts say, invest the complaint with an air of reality 
Therefore, rights and freedoms contained in BORA must be subject to "such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society"209 A limit will not be justified if it is ad hoe and arbitrary.2'
0 A 
limit must also be identifiable, adequately accessible, and sufficiently precise.2' 
1 
In New Zealand, the approach adopted is the three-step test set out in the 
Court of Appeal in Moonen21 2, which followed the leading Canadian Supreme Court 
authority R v Oakes. 213 The three-step test applied is 
b) What is the aim of the infringing act? 
c) Is it the least infringing way to achieve that aim? 
d) The proportionality between the aim and right. 
Before embarking on this test, the Court must first identify the scope of the 
relevant right or freedom. This principle has been statutorily entrenched in section one 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
2 14
, based on which section five of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was modeled. Where incursions into rights have 
been made, section five requires the defendant to show that the limit is "reasonable" 
"prescribed by law" and "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".
215 
208 R v Mallison (1993] l NZLR 529, 529 (HC) 
209 R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153 , 193 (CA); R v Te Kira j 1993] 3 ZLR 257. 27] and 277 (C' \ ) 
210 Joseph PA, Constitutional and Ad111i11istrative La IV in Ne\\' Zealand, above. note I 0. I 056 
211 R v Jeffries [1994] l NZLR 290,302 (CA) per Richards J ; R v La11gal1s ( 1993) 10 CR Z 350 (C'.-\ ). 
R v Pratt (1994] 3 NZLR 21 (CA), and R v Wojcik (1993) l l CRNZ 463 (CA) 
m Moonen v Film and Litera/11re Board of Revie\V (2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) l 6 - 17 
213 R v Oakes (1986] 2 DLR (4111) 200 (SCC) 
2 14 Constitution Act 1982 (Canada), s. 52 (1 ) (as enacted by the Canada Act 1982 ( UK), c I I). 
215 Ministry ofTransport v Noort (1992] 3 NZLR 260,283 (CA) See a lso R 1• 8111ler I 1990] 50 CCC 
(3d) 97 (Man QB) 
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This is a fair exercise in the balance of rights, which accords "'1th hoth 
procedural and substantive limbs of the rule of law; so long as the Judiciary conrinue-' 
to pursue a purposive approach where rights are being challenged as between the 
individual and the state. 216 
B Procedural Safeguards 
Freedom of expression in New Zealand is acknowledged by art1clc 1-1- ol 
BORA 217 . However, the lack of entrenchment of BORA means that there are no 
procedural safeguards set in stone before a person may be deprived of his/her freedom 
of expression. Section five is not a procedural safeguard as it does not prevent 
Parliament from enacting legislation inconsistent with BORA; furthermore , it is weak 
and often side-stepped by the Courts on the basis of section four. 21 8 
Freedom of expression in Singapore, guaranteed by article 14(1) (a)21 9 of the 
Constitution, in theory sets up procedural safeguards by virtue of its supreme status as 
an entrenched Constitutional right. However, article 14(1) concurrently mandates the 
confiscation of an individual's freedom of expression by Parliament for the reasons 
set out in article 14(2) (a) to (c/20. Such limitations on a right are based on the 
accepted legal principle that rights are not absolute, but need to be balanced against 
the competing rights of other individuals, such as collective security, order or public 
health and morals. 
In Singapore, the procedural requirement set out by article 14(2) (a) to (c) is 
the "necessary or expedient" test. So long as enactments are within the ambit of 
216 Simpson v Attorney - General ( Baigent's Case) (1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA), "It is consistent with that 
affirmed right (in BORA) to interpret s.6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act as not protecting the Crown 
from liability for the execution of a search warrant in bad faith." 
217 "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and opinions of any kind in any form" 
218 See The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths Online) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act I 990, Part I 
(5) paras 51 - 66 
219 "Every citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression" 
220 Constitution of Singapore, s 14 (l)(a) - (c), "security of Singapore .. . friendly relations with other 
countries ... public order or morality ... protecting the privileges of Parliament ... prO\ 1di ng again~t 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence" 
exceptions set out under the provisions of article 14 (2) (a) to (c), they are protected 
from invalidation. 
Regardless of the legality of the above derogation clauses, the rule of la'v\ and 
the inalienability of fundamental liberties in a democratic society require that greater 
emphasis be placed on rights. The nature of the derogation clauses, as set out in the 
Singapore Constitution mean that rights-inconsistent legislation can be justified in the 
name of state or community interest. However, the predicate of representative 
government is that change should be effected through peaceful discussion rather than 
violent means. By carving out myriad restrictions to free speech , legislative drafters 
are in fact, taking a paternalistic approach, which assumes that ci ti zens are easil) 
incited to violence, thus undermining the dignity and autonomy of the incli\1clual: and 
secondly, legislative drafters have restricted peaceful dialogue, which i:, neccs:,ar) . 
particularly in a political context, for the development of a democratic society. 
C Licensing 
Licensing, as it is practiced in Singapore through the Public Entertainment and 
Meetings Act22 1 (PEMA), is substantively unjust based on the principle that ·'although 
the state can punish an expressed opinion ... no law can validly restrain the articulation 
of an opinion". 222 As held by the High Coun in the recent case of Chee Soon Juan ,. 
Public Prosecutor223 
Article 14(2)(a) of the Constitution .. clearly allowed for legislation to l1m1t the 
exercise of the fundamental liberty of freedom of speec h. There wa~ no ab~olute 1·1ght 
to freedom of speech in society and the enactment of the Public Entertainment and 
Meetings Act (PEMA) was eminently within legislature's powers 
This line of judicial reasoning resembles the positivistic22~ refrain often 
echoed in the Singapore High Courts225 . Further, it neglects the legal principle that 
221 Public Entertainment and Meetings Act (PEMA) (Cap 257, 2001 Rev Ed) s 2 
222 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries 011 the Law of England (1765 - 69) Bk 4 Cap II 15 I - I 5_ 
223 Chee Soon Juan v Public Prosecutor [2003] SGHC 112, 120 
224 The Positive school of thought asserts that the law is what it 'is', not what it · ought to be', that is , 
law is free of the trappings of morals and principles. Major proponents of positivism include Austin, 
Bentham and Hans Kelsen . For a brief summary on the positivism see 
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/l/legalpos.htm <last accessed 18 June 2004> 
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fundamental rights require stronger protection because of the imbalance of power 
between the individual and the state. The plaintiff in this case challenged the 
constitutional validity of the PEMA in infringing his right to free speech in a manner 
that was manifestly unfair. In application, section 19(1) (a) PEMA provides that it 
shall be an offence for any person to make public speeches without a license duly 
issued under the Act. 
While the PEMA is 'law' in the sense that it was passed in a procedurally 
correct manner, adhering to the requirements of the Constitution, the effect of section 
19(1) (a) PEMA was to deprive the plaintiff of his right to free speech without good 
reason. 226 The holding in Chee Soon Juan 227 reveals that the formal guarantee of free 
speech under the Constitution is not a real guarantee in practice. 
A purely rule-based approach to the nature of law as that taken in Chee Soon 
Juan228, is problematic. Natural law thinkers argue that moral standards qualifying the 
rules229 are present in the law, even before the standards are articulated or decisions 
based upon them are announced. 230 This idea is best enunciated by Ronald Dworkin
211 
who argues that principles or non-rule standards are the lifeblood of the law to which 
a judge is entitled to have recourse to in the interpretive process in order to uphold 
substantive fairness. 232 
Furthermore, the PEMA in application, is a form of prior restraint . which 
derogates from principle of due process, by conferring on a Minister the discretion to 
225 For example, see Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs & Ors [ 1989] 2 MU 449 
226 B Jeyaretnam v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [ 1989] SLR 4 (CA) 
227 Chee Soon Juan v Public Prosecutor [2003] SGHC 112; See http://www.singapore-
window.org/sw04/0409 I 3st.htm <last accessed 15 Sep 04> 
228 Chee Soon Juan v Public Prosecutor [2003] SGHC 112 
229 (e.g. that a rule should not apply as written if it would lead to an absurd result. or if one of the 
farties had acted inequitably, and so on) 
30 See Simmonds NE, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (Sweet & Max wel I, London. I 986) 2 - -+ 
231 See generally Dworkin R, Taking Rights Seriously ( 1977) Uni vers1ty of Chicago I ,a ,1 Rei 1e\\ I-+ 
232 Fuller also fleshes out his idea of procedural law by explaining what wo uld l'lHN1tutc .i, 1,llc1t1un. 
"When a system calling itself law is predicated upon a general disregard by Judge~ of the term~ of the 
laws they purport to enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal 1rregularit1e~. e1 en the 
grossest, by retroactive statutes, when it has only to resort to forays of terror 111 the streeb. 1,h1ch nu 
one dares challenge, in order to escape even those scant restraints imposed by the pretence of legal11) 
when all these things have become true of a dictatorship, it is not hard for me, at least , to den) to 1t the 
name of Jaw." Lon Fuller, "Positivism And Fidelity To Law: A Repl y To Professor Hart" ( 195 8) 71 
Harv L Rev 630, 660 
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refuse any licence233 , for whatever conditions "as he thinks fit" 234 . In essence, a 
guarantee of due process is a guarantee of procedural fairness. 235 Before a person can 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, certain procedures must be observed, 
procedures designed to ensure faimess. 236 Apart from the adherence to formal 
procedures in the promulgation or amendment of laws, this also includes impartiality 
in judging, the giving of reasons to justify the result reached, and lastly, universalism, 
which means like cases should be treated alike. 237 
Therefore, the licence is altogether, a potent mechanism for any government to 
control and regulate activities, which it considers potentially harmful to society. In 
spite of the constitutional guarantee to free speech, the licence deviates significantly 
from both substantive and formal conceptions of the rule of law. It is unconstitutional 
and should be struck down by the Judiciary, however, it has continues to be treated as 
'law' in the sense delineated in section two of the Constitution. 
D The Law of Defamation 
Defamation in Singapore is a constitutionally entrenched limitation on the 
right238 , which extends to the critique of politicians, based on the principle that 
honorable men would not seek office if their reputation were at stake, and it would 
therefore "do the public more harm than good". 239 
233 Section 3(a) PEMA, see note 228 
234 Section 10 PEMA, see note 228 
235 The test case for Blackstone, one suggested earlier by Coke, was whether Parliament co uld so 
violate natural justice as to make a man ajudge in his own case. Coke had taken the negati ve. See, e.g., 
Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke's Rep. 226, 235 (1610), "if any act of Parlia111ent gives to any to hold, or to 
have conusans of all manner of pleas arising before hi111 within his manor of D., yet he s!ta/1 hold no 
plea, to which he himself is party; for, as hath been said, iniquwn est a/ique111 suae rei esse judice111" ( it 
is wrong for a man to be a judge in his own case); Blackstone took the affirmative, .. If we could 
conceive it possible for the Parliament to enact, that he should try as well his own causes as those of 
other persons, there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in 
such evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legis lature or not" 
Blacks tone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 91 ( 1765) 
236 Nowak John, et al., Constitutional Law (2d ed, West Publishing Co, 1983) 557 ("The essential 
fuarantee of the due process clause is that of fairness.") 
37 Blackman Rodney, There is there there: Defending th e Defenseless with Procedural Natural /mi ·, 
(1995) Arizona Law Review, Supplemental Papers 9 
238 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999) s 14 (2) (a) 
239 Jeyaretna111 Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [ 1992) 2 SLR 3 10, 
Conversely, the New Zealand case of Lange v Arkinso,/w. a cu~e. 'v\ h1ch 
similarly deals with criticism of political figures, the High Court called for ·'the 
balancing of rights, critical to the law of defamation ... to be guided by the under! ying 
assumptions of democratic government" 
The New Zealand High Court consistently looked first at the intention or the 
drafters with regards to the law of defamation 241 , and any current reviews by 
Parliament, before looking at preceding judicial decisions . 
Apart from the above, in engaging in the balancing exercise, the High Court 
appeared to be guided by five main considerations: 
(a) Present social values;242 
(b) The public interest and "chilling effect" of defamation action~; w~ 
(c) International treaties and obligations; 
244 
(d) The value accorded to the rights at issue in the Bill of Ri ghts Act
24
' 
(e) The approach of other jurisdictions246, namel y the United States. the United 
Kingdom, Canada and Australia. 
The main consideration of the High Court, being the Bill of Rights Act and the 
guiding principle of representative democracy, which the High Court acknowledged 
as paramount. 
Ultimately, Elias J, applying Australian case law247 , was of the view that it 
was for the "common convenience and welfare"248 of New Zealand society, and in 
furtherance of the enhanced protection of freedom of expression 249 , that the common 
240 Lange v Atkinson & Australian Consolidated Press NZ Lrd [ 1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) 32 per Elias 
241 Lange v Atkinson & Australian Consolidated Press NZ Lrd [ 1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC), 32 per Elias J 
242 Lange v Atkinson, above n240, 32 Elias J 
243 Lange v Atkinson, above n240, 37 Elias J 
244 Lange v Atkinson, above n240, 32 Elias J 
245 Lange v Arkinson, above n240, 45 - 46 Elias J 
246 Lange v Atkinson, above n240, 36 - 46 Elias J 
247 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd [1994] 182 CLR 105 ; 124 ALR 1 and S1epha11s ,, Wes! 
Australian Newspapers Ltd [1996] CLR 211; 124 ALR 80 applied 
248 See Baron Parke in Toogood v Spyring (1834) l CM & R 181 , 193 applied 
249 Lange v Atkinson, above n240, 34 Elias J 
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law defense of qualified p1ivilege should apply to claims for damages for defamation 
arising out of political discussion250 . 
The facts of the case in Jeyaretnam v Lee Kwan Yew 251 , was an appeal arising 
out of an action by the then Prime Minister of Singapore against the appellant. the 
secretary-general of the Worker's Party for slander based on the words spoken by the 
appellant at a political rally organized by the Worker's Party on 26 August 1988 in 
the hustings for the General Election in 1988 . The appellant accused the PAP 
government of not being honest, and cited instances, which he alleged were examples 
of them misleading the people of Singapore. 252 The respondent complained that this 
part of the appellant's speech contained grave slander on him . 
By comparison, the subject matter of defamation in Lange v Atkinso,/53 is 
materially different and of lesser gravity than the speech at issue in the Singapore 
Court of Appeal case. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper, the crucial 
observation to be made is the Court 's approach to the Constitutional interpretation of 
the freedom of expression. 
Unlike Lange v Atkinson.25", the Court of Appeal in Jevare111w11 ,, /,ee K,, un 
Yew255 accorded secondary importance to the values of democracy and free speech. 
250 Lange v Atkinson, above n240, 46 Elias J 
251 Jeyaretnam Joshua Benja111i11 v. Lee Kuan Yew [ 1992] 2 SLR 310 
252 Part of the transcript thereof (quoted in Jeyaretna1n Joshua Be11ja111i11 ,,. Lee K11011 Ye1\' j 199'.: I 2 
SLR 310, 310 - 311) "It was revealed at the coroner's inquest that Teh comm ,ned ,uH.:1de b) ea!-., ng 
poison. Under the Drugs Act. .. a register is kept of all the chemists or pharmac1sb that deal "ith this 
drug ... My question was why hasn 't the government cond ucted any inquiry to find out how Mr Teh 
came by this poison, by these drugs? Shouldn ' t the people be to ld? I said it was essential for a 
government to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth and not to hide anything ... Well l hope that 
before polling day we will be told how Mr Teh came by this poison .. But I have anot her quest ion ... Mr 
Teh wrote to the Prime Minister ... a day before hi s death ... And if my memory serves me 11ell and I 
think it does, Mr Teh ended the letter by saying I am very sorry I wi ll do as you advise. My quest ion to 
the Prime Minister. .. is ... did he respond to that letter? And if he did respond what was hi s response'? 
... Minsiters must not be allowed to escape responsibility. And Cabinet bore respons1bilit) for the 
whole thing. And I said it was wrong to allow Mr Teh co get away from answering his ques ti on and ,u 
we must know how its that he came by death . So I hope we will have answer to this question from the 
Prime Minister before polling day" 
253 The defendant, North and South magazi ne published an article lambasc ,n g the perfmmancc ,111d 
leadership of the plaintiff, David Lange during his tinw as Prime Minister. The pla ,nu ll cl,pm:, 
damages for defamation. 
254 The defendant, North and South magazi ne published an article lambasting the performance anu 
leadership of the plaintiff, David Lange during his time as Prime Minister. The plaint , ff cla , ms 
damages for defamation. 
255 Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 2 SLR 310 
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Instead, the Court of Appeal looked mainly at the wording of the Constitutional 
provision under article 14 of the right to free speech and concluded that 
Parliament is empowered to make laws to impose on the right of free speech 
restriction designed to provide against defamation. 
Article 162 of the Constitution, "any modification, adaptation, qualification 
and exception is necessary to be made to the law of defamation as to bring it into 
conformity with the Constitution", nonetheless, the Court held simply that by virtue of 
article 14(1)(a), "the law of defamation is not inconsistent under the right of free 
speech... and accordingly no such modification, adaptation, qualification and 
exception is necessary to be made thereto". The Court of Appeal affirmed that the 
right of free speech under article 14, is subject, inter alia, to the common law of 
defamation as modified by the Defamation Act256 . 
Furthermore, in Jeyaretnam v Le Kwan Yew251, the Court of Appeal referred 
with approval to a pre-Charter case, Tucker v Douglas258, which would be of limited 
relevance in Canada today, which stated 
The suggestion that a public man can be slandered or libelled in his public 
capacity is entirely without foundation .. . A man 's moral character is the sa me 
whether in private or public life and is in either case equally entitled to the 
protection of the law from the libellous attacks. 
However, where the appellant cited New York Times Co v Sullil'a1/'
9 
and 
Lingens v Austria260 in support of the right of free speech in the face of constraints 
256 Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1965 Ed) 
251 Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [ 1992] 2 SLR 310, 
258 Tucker v Douglas [ I 950) 2 DLR 827 (Sask CA) 840, per Gordan JA; The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms has been in force since 17 Apr 1982. 
259New York Times Co v Sullivan [1964) 376 US 254; The rule laid down is that a person will not be 
liable for defamaing a public figure unless 'actual malice' is proven 
260 Lingens v Austria [1986] EHRR 407; In this case, the European Court of Human Rights gave 
determinative weight to the importance of open political debate and speech as being a core pillar of 
democratic society. It also noted that the impugned expression had to be assessed 111 m particular 
context: that of a post-election political controversy where the usage of verbal weapo n~ ,rn~ ·111 no 
way unusual in the hard-fought tussles of politics.' By co mpari son. no such test~ we re applied 111 the 
Court of Appeal in Jeyarernam, see note 305 
LAW UP 8Y 
VICTORIA u~ IVb If' ur WLLUNGTON 
imposed by defamation26
1
, the Court of Appeal chose, selectively to distinguish thc'>C 
cases on the basis that262 
The terms of article 14 of our Constitution differ materiall y from the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and also from 
article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Once again, a dialogical approach is evident from the Singapore Court's 
selective use of foreign cases. By juxtaposition, although BORA is modeled against 
the Canadian Charter, the High Court in this case, chose to disregard Canadian 
authorities, which set out the non-application263 of the Charter in cases between 
individuals. By virtue of section three of BORA, Elias J held it was the responsibility 
of the Judiciary to affirm and protect rights, even between individuals
26
-1 
The application of the Act to the common law seems to me to follow from 
the language of s. 3, which refers to acts of the judicial branch of the 
Government of New Zealand, a provision not to be found in the Canadian 
Charter 
By comparing the two cases a few pertinent observations can be made. Firstly, 
it 1s evident that where the New Zealand High Court took a wide approach to 
according the individual the right to free speech, the Singapore Courts took a naJTow 
approach, and giving insufficient consideration to the context of electioneering, in 
which the facts of the case arose. 
Secondly, while both Courts defeITed to the intention of the drafters, 
ultimately, the New Zealand High Court accorded p1imacy to the value of democracy, 
and the welfare of New Zealand society - thereby, taking a purposive approach to 
261 "On the basis of these authorities, Mr Gray submitted that in order to give effect to article 14, the 
right to sue for defamation has to be curtailed, and such curtailment has been accepted in other 
jurisdictions. In particular, these authorities suggest that qualified or conditional privilege attaches to 
publications critical and defamatory of the official acts of politicians and those in public positions 
because it is the common interest of all citizens to have unconstrained political debate and effective 
democracy." leyaret11a11118 V. Lee Kuan Yew r 1992] 2 SLR 310 
262 leyaretl!am 18 v. Lee Kuan Yew, above note 260, 310, per LP Thean J 
263 Tushnet, M., "The Issue Of State Action/Horizontal Effect In Comparative Constitutional law" 
(2003) I Con 1.1(79) 3 
264 Lange v Atkinson, above 11240, 32 Elias J 
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rights. Contrastingly, the Singapore Court of Appeal placed emphasis on the 
construction of article 14 of the Constitution , which, taken lirerall_,·, allowed 
Parliament to draft exceptions to the right of free speech 265 . 
Thirdly, both jurisdictions place different emphasis on the va lue or dcmocraq 
and free speech. The defense of qualified privilege, as upheld by the Coun or Appeal 
in Lange v Atkinson266, enshrines the vital importance of freedom of pol1t1cal 
speech267 in the furtherance of democratic ideals. Furthermore, qualifi ed pri vi lege 
extends to protect the legitimate interest of the recipient to receive false 
information26
8
; as well as being borne of the recognition th at it was not al way~ right to 
presume malice from the publication of false and defamatory words. 
In considering substantive fairness, it must be borne in mind th at the element , 
of 'substantive fairness' are derived from principles , which depend for their va lidit y 
or importance on the particular circumstances of different societies.
269 By comparison . 
the Singapore Court of Appeal accorded paramountcy to public reputati on at the 
expense of the public's right to receive such information and did not accord sullic1cn1 
attention to the context of the case. From thi s case study, the ··constitullonal bargain ··. 
set out in the derogation clauses to article 14 of the Constitution, appears not to be a 
"balancing exercise", as that undertaken by Elias J in Lange v Arkinson
270
, but more 
so, a legislative tool, which ultimately leads all constitutional calculations to the same 
foregone conclusion - as enunciated in the Shared Values White Paper
271
, "Nation 
before community and society before self'. 
265 The constitutionality of the derogation clauses to article 14 of the Constitution is not at issue ; many 
Western liberal democracies also provide for limits to rights. The issue is that the Courts chose to take 
a positive approach and read narrowly rights , which by virtue of democracy, should be accorded a wide 
ambit. 
266 Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 
267 R v Keegsrra [1991] 2 WWR (SCC) 56 per Dickinson CJC 
268 Lange v Atkinson, above note 240, 469 - 470 
269 See Raz Joseph , The Rule Of Law And Its Virtue (1977) 93 LQR I 95, l 96; See Raz Joseph, Law. 
Morality, And Society (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977) 
270 Lange v Atkinson, above n240 
27 1 White Paper on Shared Values (Cmnd I of 1991 ), introduced in January 1993. However, the Shared 
Values lack constitutional and legal standing, "(l) Nation before community and soc iety above self; (2) 
Family as the basic unit of society; (3) Community suppo rt and respect fo r the indi vidual ; ( 4) 
Consensus, not conflict; and (5) Racial and religious harmony" 
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E Censorship 
In Singapore, The Singapore Undesirable Publications Act272 , the Minister has 
discretion to "prohibit the importation , sale or circulation" of publications that are 
"contrary to the public interest." 
Censuring is justifiable on the basis that it may harm "public morality"
27 3, 
even to the extent of paternalism. In New Zealand, the justification for censorship 
laws274 is that there must be enough perceived harm or potential for harm in the 
material in question to outweigh the general right of freedom of expression. 2-,-
However, it takes a strenuous interpretation to extend censorship to religious 
materials, as was the case in Colin Chan v PP. 276 In this case, the Mini ster for 
Information and the Arts was found to have acted rationally in banning publications 
produced by the International Bible Studies Association (hereinafter " IBSA") - a 
denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses. The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's 
decision by finding that Jehovah's Witnesses do not partake in warfare, which 
threatens the national security of Singapore. The Court additionally stated that issues 
of "national security are not justiciable." 
The stated reason by the Courts for the threat posed by the religion to National 
security, per Yong CJ 
The Jehovah's Witnesses were perceived to be a threat to national ~ec urn y. in their 
staunch belief that Satan is the God of thi s world and thus refuse to ~a lute to the flag 
of any nation or perform national service, that they were banned. 
272 Undesirable Publications Act, (Cap 338) The Statutes of The Republic of Singapore ( 198:i re\, . ed . l 
273 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, s 14 (2) (a) 
274 The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act I 993, s 3 ( I) - (3) 
275 Society for the Pro111orion of Co111111u11ity Sra11dards In c 1• Waverley /1uemariona/ I 1988) Ltd J 1993 J 
2 NZLR 709, 727 
276 Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v. Minisrer fo r rit e !11for111atio11 and the Arrs [ 1996 J I SLR 609. 639 
(prosecuted under the Singapore Undesirable Publicati ons Act, see note 278) 
57 
The Court established the nexus between the promulgation of the Jehovah 's 
Witness faith and its threat to national security as such 277 
It is not disputed that Jehovah's Witnesses do in fact refuse to do National 
Service and that this is a central tenet of their faith. It is the appellants' own case 
that the publications of !BSA are essential for the appellants in the profession, 
practice and propagation of their faith (had it been otherwise, there would be no 
question of article 15 being involved and the appellants would have no locus 
standi). It must follow, then, that these publications are essential for the 
profession, practice and propagation of beliefs, a central tenet of which is the 
refusal to do National Service. It seems to us self-evident that this by itself 
establishes the factual basis that issues of national security are involved here. 
The High Court further promulgated that threats to national security were the 
prerogative of the executive, and thus precluded judicial review, in affirmation of the 
principle stated in the Court of Appeal case of Chng Suan Tze2
78
, and further, of the 
ratio in Lee Mau Seng v Minister of Home Affairs2
79
, (which has been constitutionally 
entrenched by virtue of section 8B(2) ISA) 280 , that such ministerial discretion wa 
subjective, thus judicial review should only lie with respect to issues of compliance 
with procedural requirements. 
The ban on religious materials published by the IBSA, on the basis of national 
security, was affirmed in the subsequent case of Liang Kok Keng
281 where the High 
Court held that282 
277 Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v. Minister/or the Infor111ation and the Arrs, above note 274. 618 -
619 
278 Chng Suan Tze v The Minister of Home Affairs & Ors and 01her appeal:, 119891 I MLJ 69. 83. per 
Wee Chong Jin CJ, " It is clear that where a decision is based on considerati on~ on national ~ecur1t1. 
judicial review of that decision would be precluded." 
279 Lee Mau Seng v Minister of Home Affairs [1971] 2 MLJ 137 
28° Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1989 (No l of 1989) which came 1n10 
effect on 27 January 1989 
281 Liang Kok Ke!!g v Public Prosecutor [ 1996] 3 SLR 263, The appellant, who was a member of the 
Jehovah's Witnesses, was convicted of two offences under s 4(2) of the Undesirable Publicauon~ Act 
(Cap 338) for having in his possession publications which were prohibited under s 3( l) of the said Act. 
vide Gazette Notification No 123 dated 14 January 1972 (Order 123) and Gazette Nollficarion No ~OS 
dated 4 February 1994 (Order 405). The Orders prohibited the importation, sa le and circu la ti on of all 
materials published or printed by the Watch Tower Bible and Tract S0<.:1ety (WTBTS) and the 
International Bible Student's Association (IBSA). 
282 Liollg Kok Kel!g v Public Prosecutor, above note 279, 266 F - G; Chan Hiang Leng & On 1· 
Minister for Information and !he Arts [1996] l SLR 609 followed 
Article 15(1), which enshrined the fundamental ri ght of a person to profess , 
practice and propagate hi s reli gion, must be read in the li ght of art 15(4) wh ich 
clearly envisaged that the right to freedom of re li gion was subject to inherent 
limita tions and was not an absolute and unqua lifi ed right. 
5X 
Importantly, the ban on all IBSA material s was a blanket ban, regardlc~s ol the 
content of the material. Therefore , hypothetically speaking, a generic Kin g James 
Bible, published under any other publication would be permi ss ible , but if publi shed 
by the IBSA, would be banned. 
In a similar case involving censuring of religious mate1ial , the Court of Appeal 
in Livingword 283 took the opposite approach, elevating the importance of freedom of 
expression even in the face of discrimination. 284 The Court held that a publication on 
"sex" was only objectionable under s 3(1) of the Films, Videos , and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 if it dealt with sexual activities. The purpose of the Act being 
to prevent the distribution of pornographic material that is injurious to the public 
good. Further, it was held that the Bill of Rights was a limitation on governmental. not 
p1ivate conduct,285 choosing to construe a wide ambit to individual rights , even to the 
extent of permitting morally undesirable material. 
F Some Observations 
It may be justifiable, as an extension of the "constitutional bargain" for 
limitations to be read into the right to free speech in the name of national secu1ity and 
public order would prohibit speech, which creates imminent violence. However, it has 
been opined that such limitations also restricts speech that is nowhere near creating 
racial riots, and in fact, the speech abridged by this rationale may have helped quell 
tensions286 . For example, denying circulation of Jehova's Witness publications 
283Living Word Distributors Ltd v Human Rights Ac1io11 Group Inc [2000] 3 NZLR 570 (CA). 
284 see note 98 at 592 , the videos were essentially po liti ca l tracts, a ltho ugh the emphas1~ was on the 
petceived prnmiscuity and irresponsible sexual behaviour of male homosexuals and the fact that the1 
have chosen to pursue the "homosexual lifestyle". 
285 Livingword, above note 281, 583 
286 Goodroad Scott L , "The Challenge of Free Speech: Asian Values v Unfe ttered Free Speech, An 
Analysis of Singapore and Malaysia in the New Global Order" (1998) 9 Ind . lnt 'l & Comp. L. Re, . 
259,300 
because they may threaten war efforts is not an imminent threat to the securit y of 
Singapore. If any threat exists, it is the spread of pacifist ideal s th at may challen ge the 
apparent extreme political realism that was exemplified by the court. Even so, the 
blanket ban on all IBSA publications continues to exist as the law287 . 
The "constitutional bargain" entails the balancing of conflicting interests in 
society. In a democratic society, this balance should veer towards the objective of 
minimizing curtailment of fundamental liberties , in Favor of the indi vi dual. 
Conversely, where issues of national security, or public moralit y are at stake. the 
balance to be achieved, depends largely on the values embraced by society. In ,1 
utilitarian matrix , society may elevate the interest of the commun it y over that ol the 
individual - this too, must be accepted as a legitimate formula. 
Every society will place varying emphasis on different values. For example, 
cases from a variety of countries examined in relation to hate speech, Fa11rriso11 1 
F 288 c z· . 289 . J')O 
1 v1 ranee, hap msky v New Hampslure, Brandenburg v Ohio ,- R 1· Keegsrrci-
all recognize that freedom of expression has a wide ambit; nonetheless, they differ in 
their assessment of what will constitute a justified limitation on the right. This 
approach292 is in accordance with the notion that293 
A constitution, in nothing more than a forma l sense, is on ly an organi~ation of men 
and women. Its character depends upon the character of the people engaged 111 
governing and being governed. 
However, it is axiomatic that where fundamental rights and liberti es are at 
stake, the context of the situation, the gravity of the limits placed against the freedom 
of the individual, and the degree of "harm" (in the context of censorship and 
defamation) must be taken into account. Furthermore, in the case of Singapore, where 
287 http://www.s ingapore-window.org/80330up.htm <last accessed 17 Sep. 04>; On issues of rights in 
Singapore, see, generally, http ://www.singapore-wi ndow.org/rights.htm <last accessed 17 Sep. 04> 
288 Faurisson v France (16 December 1996) Com No 550/1993, CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (UNHRC) 
289 Chaplinsky v New Hampshire [1942] 315 US 568 
290 Brandenburg v Ohio [ 1969] 395 US 444 
291 R v Keegstra [1991] 2 WWR l (SCC) 
292 The "life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." See Holmes OW, The Co1111no11 Lall' 
(MacMillan, London, 1882) l 
293 Jennings Ivor, The Law and the Constitution , (4 ed, University of London Press, London, 1952) xv 
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the invocation of "national security" is made, the nexus between such allegations and 
the right to freedom of expression and religion must be a proximate one, which is 
logically and fairly established. Entrenchment, as a procedural safeguard, is lost if the 
Judiciary continually adopt an attitude subservient to the whims of Parliament. 
While the approach taken by the New Zealand Courts is indicative of a wide, 
purposive approach, it is also evident that much reliance is placed on purposive 
interpretation, and common law defenses, rather than a direct application of BORA 
article fourteen. Furthermore, ultimately, rights may be legislatively oveJTuled by 
"dint of section four". 294 Entrenchment is necessary, not only as a procedural 
safeguard, but also to encourage the common law development of the rights affirmed 
in BORA. It has been lamented that the lack of case law has negatively impacted the 
section seven reporting mechanism, by not providing sufficient guidelines for the 
Attorney General by which to make a rights-call on Bills. 
VI Looking Outside an Entrenched Bill of Rights 
A Alternative Safeguards to Rights 
When interpreting enactments dealing with individual's rights and freedoms . 
the purposive approach, as applied by New Zealand Courts
295 in this manner. permits 
a less legalistic, more generous, rights-centred approach. Consequently, substantive 
fairness is achieved through purposive interpretation of a Bill of Rights. 
Nonetheless, although the New Zealand Courts have carved out substant i, e 
safeguards to 1ights through taking a purposive reading to rights. nonethclc ~~. th l''>L' 
holdings, despite being law, may be prospectively ove1TL1led by legislation , "by dint or 
section four". Acknowledging that Constitutional supremacy is political untenabl e 111 
294 Quilter v Attorney-General [ 1998] I NZLR 513 (CA) 523 
295"A purposive approach to the interpretation of BORA requires the identificat1,ln of the parttrnla r 
right. The Act's guarantees are cast in broad and imprecise terms and the identifi cation o f the obj ec t of 
the particular right allows for the inclusion within its scope of conduct that trul y co me~\,\ 1thin that 
purpose and, the exclusion of activity that fall s outside", MOT 1· Noort / / 992 I 3 NZLR ?<JU: See Hogg. 
"Interpreting the Charter of Rights: Generality and Justifi cation: ( 1990) 28 O~goode Hal I LJ 8 I 7 
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a legal framework enshrining Parliamentary sovereignty, this part of the paper 
considers the feasibility of alternatives to strengthening the application of BORA, 
without entrenchment. 
Apart from entrenchment of BORA, it is submitted that an alternative 
safeguard is to strengthen the interpretive function of BORA, through enhancing the 
operation of section five, six and seven in tandem, with an objective towards 
strengthening the role of the Judiciary as a check on Parliament and the Executive. 
1. Judicial Indications of Inconsistency 
Despite the watered-down nature of BORA in its un-entrenched form, the 
Judiciary also possess, by way of section five of BORA, the ability to make 'judicial 
indications of inconsistency' where legislation unwittingly overrides the rights 
preserved in BORA. A robust application of section five has the potential to serve as 
an alternative substantive safeguard of rights, which would further complement the 
arguably weak section seven reporting mechanism, provided in BORA.
296 
Nonetheless, it has been lamented that presently, section five is still a weak 
guardian of rights. 297 Unlike section one of the (entrenched and supreme) Canadian 
Charter298 , on which BORA section five is modeled, where a justified limit is 
prescribed by statutory law, in New Zealand, that law will prevail, whether or not that 
is "reasonable" or "demonstrably justified". Therefore, the section five inquiry only 
has application with regards to common law rights
299
, and to determine if there is in 
fact a legislative inconsistency for the purposes of the section seven reporting 
mechanism. 
296 See generally Huscroft, "The Attorney-General, the Bill of Rights and the Public Interest" 1n 
Huscroft and Rish worth (eds), Rights and Freedoms ( I 995 ) 133-170; and Rish worth, "Human R1 gh1 , 
and Bill of Rights" I 996 NZ Law Review 298 , 306 
297 See, generally Butler AS, "Judicial Indications of Inconsistency- A Ne½ Weapon 1111he Bill of 
Rights Armoury?" 2000 NZ Law Review 43 
298 Constitution Act 1982 (Canada), s 52( 1) as enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U K ). c l l 
299 BORA has unqualified application to common law rules , see for example, Solic i1o r-C e11 eral ,, Radw 
NZ Ltd [ 1994) J NZLR 48 where the law of contempt of court was a justified co mmon la w limit on 
freedom of expression 
Conversely, as argued by the Court of Appeal in Moonen 300 since section five 
was retained, notwithstanding the later addition of section four, should it not ·'be 
regarded as serving some useful purpose" in relation to statutes? While section four 
would make it unlawful for a court to impliedly repeal, invalidate, or decline to apply 
a BORA-inconsistent provision, nothing in it renders an indication, proclamation, or 
declaration of inconsistency unlawful. Furthermore, if judicial indications or 
inconsistency cannot be made then section five is a white elephant, adding nothing to 
the elaboration of statute Jaw. Could Parliament, as the framers of BORA have really 
intended such a result? 
The strengthening of the section five mechanism requires clear lcg1 ~"-1t1 ,c 
indication to the effect that the Judiciary is empowered to make judicial indications. 
or daringly, declarations of inconsistency; failing which , in a Westminster system, the 
Judiciary would continue to tread gingerly. In the UK, this mandate was given to the 
UK through section four of the Human Rights Act.301 
In the controversial case of Quilter v A-G302, the non-application of section 
five by the Courts resulted in three lesbian couples being refused maniage licenses 
under the Marriage Act 1955. Among the judgments, Tipping J held simply that the 
Marriage Act prevai Jed "by dint of section four" 303 . 
Therefore, it is submitted that the strengthening of section five, armed with 
procedural safeguards is necessary to prevent such occu1Tences. It has been suggested 
that if the jmisdiction is adopted by the courts then affected persons should be able to 
apply as of right (but subject to the appropriate standing rules) for an indication of 
inconsistency, meaning that proceedings can be taken even though it is accepted that 
300Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (1999] 5 HRNZ 224,234 
301 0n the other hand, were section five to be strengthened by Parliament, there would need to be for 
procedural safeguards to ensure society is not held captive to the personal morals and prejudices of an 
unelected Judiciary; since section five, is largely an exercise requiring the Court to make value 
judgments that may well involve social, legal, moral, economic, administrative, ethical and other 
considerations, as indicated by the Court of Appeal in Moonen, above note 298; It has been pointed out 
that the sort of exercise envisaged by Moonen and its (political) consequences in the case of 
inconsistency found are too serious to permit casualness or substantial variations dependent on an 
individual judge's outlook and style. See Butler AS, "Judicial Indications of Inconsistency -- A New 
Weapon in the Bill of Rights Armoury?, above note 295, 55 
302 Quilter v A-G above note 292, 523 
303 Quilter v A-G above note 292, 540 
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there is no potential for the application of section six BORA , and all that is sought to 
be established is that a statute places an unjustified limitation on a BORA ri ght. Ir it 
were otherwise, the impression could be created that the courts favor certain types or 
cases over others, a stance that is inconsistent with the BORA itself. 30-1 
2. Common Law Rights 
Implied or Common Law rights , crafted by the Judiciary, serve as substantive 
safeguards to the menace of absolute power, and Diceyan positivism. As emphatically 
expressed by Cooke J in Taylor v NZ Poultry Board305 , "some common law rights 
presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not oveITide them" . This is a 
judicial re-assertion of the Bonham p1inciple306 and a reclaiming of the traditional role 
of a judge as a bulwark between the State and the indi vidua l. The !'car o! 
Parliamentary sovereignty in this regard, is the lack of substanti ve sa!'eguards aga1n-;t 
rights-encroachment, as indicated, obiter dicra in the Court or Appeal. per Cooke. 
McMullin and Ongley JJ307 
Indeed we have reservations as to the extent to which in New Zea land , even an 
Act of parliament can take away the ri gh ts of cit izens to resort to the orcl1na rJ 
courts of law for the determination of their rights 
Nonetheless, at this juncture, the debate over fundamental common law rights 
remains "theoretical" and "extra-judicial"308 . o Court has invalidated or dis-applied 
a statute for encroaching on common law rights. In Cooper ,, A-G attempts were 
made, unsuccessfully, to juxtapose the Magna Carta309, and Cooke J' s common la'v\ 
30~ Butler AS, "Judicial Indications ofi nconsistency-- A ew Weapon in the 8111 ol Right~ r\rml llll >,. 
above note 295, 56; To similar effect see Rishworth, "Human Ri ghts and Bill of Right~" 1999 . Z L111 
Review 457, 469 
305 Taylor v NZ Poultry Board [1984] NZLR 394,398 per Cooke J 
306 See Dr Bonham's Case, above note 119 
307 NZ Drivers ' Assn v NZ Road Carriers (1982] l NZLR 374,390 
308 Cooper v A-G [ 1996] 3 NZLR 480, 484 
309 Coke E, 2 Institutes of the Laws of England 50 (W. Clarke and Sons, l 809); See Holdsworth 
William, l A History of English Law 61 in Methuen & Co., A.L. Goodhart and H.G. Hanbury. eds (7 
ed. J 956) (Restatement of French Ori gi nal ) ( l 350) 25 Ed.3, st.5 , c -+ ( "en clue manere ou proces fall ~ur 
brief original a la commune lei" ) 
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rights dicta in Taylor3' 0 . The Courts in New Zealand have consistently affirmed 
Parliament's sovereignty and rationalized the Magna Carta as a " rule of law" concept 
having "special historical status", rather than as a constitutional trump. Similarly, in 
Carter v Police311, Gallen J pronounced, "Parliament cannot bind its successors, 
except in a procedural sense". Therefore, presently, this alternative course to 
safeguarding rights, without entrenching BORA, is too weak to be tenable. 
3 IOTay/or v NZ Poultry Board above note 303, 398 per Cooke J 
3 11 Carter v Police 29/4/99 (HC) Wellington CP 41/99, 15, per Gallen J 
VII CONCLUSION 
For a Bill of Rights to have effect as a procedural safeguard against State 
powers, it has to be able to restrain or limit State incursions into individual rights. In 
New Zealand, BORA serves mainly in an educative capacity, to affirm rights and 
provide a guideline for legislative drafters, owing to its status as ordinary legislation. 
As enunciated by its Parliamentary sponsor, the problem was that the watered-down 
BORA was specifically intended to only provide guiding lights to the executive and 
legislature.312 The primary thrust of BORA is not to deter official misconduct but to 
positively assure that rights exist. 313 
In Singapore, Part IV of the Constitution has the potential to affirm and protect 
rights, however, owing to the Judiciary's niggardly, positivistic approach to 
Constitutional interpretation, the strength of Part IV is diminished, as evidenced in 
cases such as Jabar v PP314 , where the Court of Appeal held that 
Any law, which provides for the deprivation of a person's life or personal 
liberty, is valid and binding so long as it is validly passed by Parliament. The 
court is not concerned with whether it is also fair, just and reasonable as well 
Substantively, the rule of law is the ideal of rule by an accurate public 
conception of individual rights.315 Therefore, adherence to a substantive conception of 
the rule of law safeguards rights by requiring that the contenr of laws, capture and 
enforce substantive justice and moral rights. 
This paper has focused on the content of 1ights-inconsistent legislation, rather 
than the content of the Bill of Rights provisions themselves. This is premised on the 
assumption that the greater threat to rights is State incursions to individual rights , 
rather than the "freezing" or fossilization of a specific formulation of rights , as 
312 510 NZPD 3450-51 (2nd reading); 510 NZPD 3760-61 (3rd reading) 
313 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section five, see note 2 
314 Jabar v PP, above note 181,617 
315 Dworkin R, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA, 1986) 407 - 410 
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expressed in the White Paper,316 particularly in a system of Parliamentary Supremacy 
(New Zealand) or a "dominant one-party Parliament" (Singapore). 
Entrenchment is necessary as a procedural safeguard against nghh-
inconsistent legislation. While rights adjudication may involve "the making or 
political choices in a political context pervaded by moral disagreement"
317
, there arc 
situations where limitations to rights are clearly justifiable. In those situations, who 
will protect the rights of the individual, if not by the vehicle or an independent 
Judiciary, reading purposively from an entrenched Bill of Rights? 
A Bill of Rights exists to "affirm and protect rights"
3 18
, as expressly stated ,n 
the long title to BORA, which has been consistently accepted in common lav. _wJ A 
Bill of Rights cannot protect rights unless it possesses the legal capacity to place 
limits on government - therefore, BORA in its present state, is inadequate . The dircL·t 
application of BORA to common law is weak320 , "by dint or section fou r". ,:-, 
In its interpretive function, the strength of substantive safeguards depends 
largely on the approach taken by the Judiciary.
322 However, it is the threat or 
inevitable consequence of legislative over-ruling, which creates reluctance among the 
Judiciary to develop a robust rights regime. As this paper has shown, this threat has 
proven both endemic, and inimical to the flourishing of common law rights 
316 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper, A.6 Appendices ro th e Journal of rh e House of 
Representatives, Wellington, 1985 
317 Ekins Richard, "Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law" (2003) LQR 119 (JAN) 140 
318 The long title to the Bill of Rights Act 1990, see note 2 
319 See Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong (1991] l NZLR 439,440; (1990-921 I NZBORR I 
(CA), Ministry of Transport v Noort (1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 282 ; (1992) 8 CR Z 114 ; I ZBORR 97 
(CA) at 268 (Cooke P) and 292 (Gault J) , R v Goodwin [ 1993] 2 ZLR 153 (CA) at 168 (Coo ke Pl. 
and R v Te Kira (1993] 3 NZLR 257 (CA) at 261 (Cooke P) 
320 Mclay Geoff, "A Symposium On Defamation And Political Expression: Lange v Atkinson Not A 
Case For Dancing In The Streets" (2000) NZLR 427, 432 
321 Quilter v A-G above note 292, 523 
322"A written constitution is rarely ever a complete document containing all the rules for constituuo nal 
government. A central and continuing issue is: what are the additional rules, practices, or assumptions, 
which are necessary to give life to a constitution? These assumptions may be based on the political 
theory underlying a parliamentary democracy, or they may take the form of concepts expressed in the 
constitution, which are interpreted in the light of the country of origin or of countries that have used 
these expressions", SA de Smith, Constitutional and Ad111inisrrative Law, 5
th ed., edited by Harry Street 
and Rodney Brazier (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex , 1985), chap. I; Wheare KC, 
Modern Constitutions (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), chap. l 
protections m both jurisdictions. In a more recent constitution case, the Singapore 
High Court323 pronounced that 
Although the legislature may, by Act of Parliament, lawfull y deprive a person of his 
liberty under art 9 of the Constitution, the lawfu l deprivation of liberty under art 9 
had to adhere to the principles of natural justice and wa~ not to be in derogati on of 
the Constitution. In particular, such deprivation was not to be di»criminato,')-
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal, overturned the judgment in this case, but the 
important thing to note is that the Judiciary in Singapore is still empowered to 
challenge unconstitutional legislation324 , because of the supreme status of our 
Constitution. However, where a dominant one-party Parliament has the ability to 
constitutionally oust judicial review, as illustrated in the amendment of the Internal 
Security Act, subsequent to the judicial challenge in Chng Suan Tze, the procedural 
safeguard of formal entrenchment is Jost. Therefore, it is submitted that in Singapore, 
the strength of Part IV of the Constitution is no greater than that of BORA, owing to 
legislative overruling, the phenomenon of 'ouster clauses' and a line of cases evincing 
a judicial attitude akin to literal subservience to Parliament' s intent. 
Conversely, purposive interpretation in New Zealand has pa\ ed the \\ a) ror :1 
robust human 1ights regime at common law , in spite of its status in the stalulnn 
hierarchy. Therefore, one can conclude that BORA has achieved , to its fullest extent. 
what it set out to achieve in its non-entrenched form - to implement in ew Zealand a 
"rights-centered" approach. While BORA is not directly applicable to common. case 
Jaw has shown consistently, that the spirit of BORA
325 continues to make in-roads 
into common law. Consequently, despite its non-entrenched form, the Juc.liciar) htt~ . 
through purposive readings, garnered all the strength of a Bill of Right s Act lO\\ arJs 
the creation of common Jaw defenses and remedies
326 in favor of rights protection. 
323 Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [ I 998] l SLR 943 at 965, para 5 - 59 
324 Legislation at issue was the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 24 l. I 993 Eel) ~ 3 7 
325 Lange v Atkinson , above n240, 32 Elias J 
326 Si111pson v Allorney-General ( Baig net 's Case) 11994 J 3 NZLR 66 7. 706 ( C \ l pc, C ;,1ull .I 
Parliament expressly bound itself: see the implementation of natural JU~llce principle~ undc1 BUR\ 1,11 
select committee procedures ; see The Laws of New Zea land, (Butterworth~ On! 1ne ) Con~t11ut1,1n,tl I .i 11 
(9) Human Rights and Freedoms, para 5 l - 66 
Lastly, contextually, the divergent political cultures in New Zealand and 
Singapore, respectively, have had a significant effect on the nurturing and deadenin g 
of the rights regime in each society. In Singapore, the Shared Values White Paper
327 
enshrines Confucian values of deference by the individual to the collective. However, 
compounded by a dominant one-party government, it is then the interest of 
Parliament, which arbitrarily dictates the interest of the collective. 
In conclusion, the realistic proposal for both New Zealand and Singapore is a 
paradigmatically focus shift away from the constant tug-of-war between the Judiciary 
and Parliament, towards the fostering of a rights regime enshrining the inalienability 
of the Aristotelian belief in the dignity of the individual. Procedurally , in e\.v 
Zealand, presuming that entrenchment is political untenable in a system of 
parliamentary sovereignty, the alternative would be to strengthen BORA section six, 
thus allowing the Judiciary to make judicial declarations of inconsistency. This would 
encourage common law developments of BORA section five and section six, and as a 
corollary, strengthen the review of pre-legislative drafting
328
, through an increased 
articulation of the rights calculation in ew Zealand. Conversely, in Singapore, the 
problem is substantive and intractable, apart from judicial over-ruling of the adopted 
"purposive approach", one can only hope that someday, the development of a more 
representative government can slowly heal the wounds caused by the pursuit of one 
party's interests. 
327 Shared Values White Paper (Cmd 21 of 1991 ) (Singapore National Printers) para 41, ·"The concept 
of government by honourable men who have a duty to do right for the people, and who ha ve the trust 
and respect of the population, fits us better than the Western idea that a government should be given a 
limited powers as possible, and should always be treated with suspicion unless proven otherwi se" 
328 BORA section seven, " the reporting mechanism" , see note 294 
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